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REASON GIVING AND RULE MAKING IN PROCEDURAL LAW 
Robin J. Effron* 
Judges are the managers of the cases litigated before them and the 
administrators of the procedural rules that govern the litigation of cases. 
This Article investigates problems with the procedural rules closely 
associated with a judge’s managerial capacity and suggests a new 
paradigm for crafting and evaluating these rules by drawing on the 
administrative law principles of reason giving in decisionmaking. 
I argue that for certain types of procedural rules, rulemakers should 
abandon the task of trying to regulate procedure by promulgating rules or 
standards regarding the desired outcome of the application of the device at 
issue. Instead, they should turn their attention to regulating the process by 
which judges make procedural decisions. Borrowing concepts from 
administrative law, this Article argues that rulemakers should employ the 
technique of reason giving to regulate select procedural devices. Reason 
giving and the information it produces can work in tandem in the 
procedural realm by leveraging a core intuition—that requiring regulators 
and the regulated to engage in a reasoning process constitutes an effective 
form of regulation. The Article envisions how rulemakers can promote this 
sort of process among trial court judges, and how that process can 
ameliorate some of the problems that rulemakers encounter in current 
attempts to regulate procedural devices. 
The Article concludes by suggesting that commentators rethink the 
value of precedential opinions in some procedural decisions. Rather than 
straining to identify uniformity in the application of vague standards, 
rulemakers should be satisfied that they have regulated an area through the 
delegation of authority and the promotion of a systematic use of that 
authority by judges as regulators and regulated subjects. These sorts of 
decisions have the potential for developing stability and standards in 
certain areas of procedural law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today’s trial judge has a dual role. In her traditional robes, she hears 
motions and conducts trials; she charges the jury and writes opinions. But 
in her more modern garb she is an administrator and a manager. She 
shepherds the cases on her docket, managing the scope of the lawsuit with 
decisions grouping parties and claims; she oversees the volume and pace of 
discovery. In large cases such as class actions or actions consolidated as 
multidistrict litigation, she might supervise a complex scheme of claim 
notice and award distribution. Despite these two functions, the procedural 
tools available to the judge are largely the implements developed for and 
suited to the older, more traditional role. Given the realities of modern 
EFFRON 683-733 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2014  1:32 PM 
2014] Reason Giving and Rule Making 685 
litigation, rulemakers should rethink the structure of the rules most closely 
aligned with a judge’s managerial and administrative role. It is time to look 
directly to the mechanisms of administrative law to solve the administrative 
problems of litigation. 
It is sometimes easier to identify the existence of a problem within civil 
procedure than to diagnose the sources of the problem. When scholars and 
commentators tackle problematic procedural issues, their critiques and 
suggestions are often directed at multiple levels of inquiry. 
The big-picture questions of procedural theory contemplate the role 
that procedure can or should play in a system of dispute resolution. 
Procedural theory at this broad and abstract level involves regarding the 
purpose that procedure itself should serve. These are the overarching 
theoretical questions about procedure, the ones that ask: “Why does 
procedure matter?” and “what goals should procedure advance?”1 The 
American system accommodates many different values. It is here that one 
finds the bedrock principles of procedure: that it should be fair, efficient, 
and predictable; that it should serve the needs of litigants in particular and 
society at large; that it results in the final and accurate resolution of 
disputes between private parties. These broad ideals set the agenda for 
selecting and designing procedural devices, and act as baselines for 
assessing the successes or failures of how procedure functions in a system 
of dispute resolution. 
While theories and ideals provide a general framework for discussions 
about the design and function of a procedural system, they do not lead 
inexorably to a particular device or set of devices. Procedural devices are 
the means by which procedural ends are carried out, and the existence and 
design of these devices represent the “basic choice[s] of procedural form.”2 
Many procedural devices exist as part of an arsenal of tools from which 
judges or parties can choose to shape litigation. These devices have 
emerged and evolved through informal judicial practice, written judicial 
opinions, and formal rulemaking by legislatures or committees. A given 
procedural device or a set of procedural devices might not be the best 
solution to a procedural problem and is usually not the only answer to a 
procedural problem. Nonetheless, the selection and use of procedural 
devices is what transforms dispute resolution from the aspirational to the 
actual. 
Most procedural devices are implemented through a written rule or set 
of rules. Crafting these rules is an important task, and just as in any other 
 
1. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 975 (1987) (describing broad theoretical 
questions about procedure). 
2. Id. at 912. 
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substantive area of law, decisions about rule design can have a serious 
impact on the function of a regulatory scheme or device. 
The rule for the device might be designed as a rule, a standard, a multi-
factored test, a set of guidelines,3 or perhaps there might not be a stated rule 
at all, with rulemakers simply relying on a set of practices and 
conventions.4 It might be forged through legislation, through notice and 
comment rule making, through another formalized rulemaking process, or 
through adjudication. The rule might expressly delegate discretion to a 
judge or impart interpretive discretion to the judiciary to fill in the 
particulars of a broadly articulated principle.5 
The questions of why and how rule design matters are not new to civil 
procedure or to any other area of law. This Article aims to do more than 
make the obvious claims that the overarching goals of civil procedure are 
important, that the selection of procedural devices matter, and that good 
rule design is critical to the success of a procedural system. Rather, it 
examines how rule design can be improved by looking beyond the 
traditionally conceived relationships between theory, rule choice, and rule 
design. This permits an assessment of rule design without having to 
constantly reevaluate and justify decisions about broad procedural theory or 
the choices of existing procedural devices. 
For the purposes of this Article, I assume that the overarching goals 
and values of civil procedure remain indeterminate—that is, I accept that 
rulemakers, judges, and commentators are unlikely to settle on a unified set 
of compatible theories to underpin the whole of procedure that could 
single-handedly dictate the results of a search for optimal rule selection and 
design. I also assume that the existing set of devices used in American 
procedure remains constant.6 Although the current arsenal of devices may 
not consist of the best possible solutions to various procedural problems, 
they are the methods that have emerged through the formal and informal 
processes of device development. This Article investigates whether certain 
aspects of rule design can improve procedure, even if the debates and 
puzzles over device selection remain unsolved. Although this Article 
 
3. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 
(1992) (describing rules, standards, and other variations in types of legal rules); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 959 (1995) (describing “a fuller sense of the repertoire of 
available devices”); see also Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE 
L.J. 65, 88 (1983) (discussing the use of guidelines). 
4. Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or 
Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1993) (discussing the importance of practices and 
conventions in guiding judicial decisionmaking). 
5. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961, 1967–70 (2007) (describing explicit and interpretive discretion). 
6. This is not to say that devices do remain constant. For example, the current growth of large 
multi-distract litigation consolidated actions as compared with class actions might signal the rise of one 
device in prominence and the decline of another. 
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focuses on the problems posed by certain joinder devices, the analysis 
could be extended to other devices closely associated with managerial 
judging, such as certain rules governing discovery. 
This Article is part of a larger project that I have undertaken to 
investigate the problems that arise with the procedural rules that stand at 
the intersection of traditional and managerial judging. The standards 
governing some of the rules for joinder of claims and parties embody many 
of these problems. The standards that govern these rules, particularly the 
“transaction or occurrence” standard and the “common question of law or 
fact” standard, are notoriously inscrutable. Judges and scholars lament the 
lack of uniformity but brush it aside as an unfortunate byproduct of the 
flexibility and discretion that joinder necessarily entails. Standards for 
joinder have become a moving target for judges and litigants alike—a state 
of affairs that no one appears to like but that everyone appears to accept as 
unhappily inevitable. I have argued that it is a mistake to write off the 
doctrinal difficulties in certain procedural rules as the inevitable product of 
managerial judging and judicial discretion.  The root of the problem lies in 
a mismatch between the purpose of the procedural devices themselves and 
how the rules implementing these devices have been crafted.7 That 
observation alone is only one half of the story. If the current rules are not 
working, then what should go in their place? 
This Article begins to answer that question by looking at the problem 
of managing litigation through an administrative law lens. For certain types 
of procedural rules, rulemakers should abandon the task of trying to 
regulate procedure by promulgating rules or standards regarding the desired 
outcome of application of the device at issue. Instead, they should turn their 
attention to regulating the process by which judges make procedural 
decisions by employing the tool of a reason-giving requirement to regulate 
select procedural devices. By combining an explicit grant of discretion with 
factors that a judge must consider and a requirement that a judge must state 
specific reasons for her decision, such a rule would begin to capture the 
balance of flexibility and uniformity that has thus far been elusive. 
The process of giving reasons addresses judges in their roles as 
regulators of procedure as well as subjects of procedural regulation, 
because they too are actors in the dispute resolution system. By 
encouraging judges to consider certain categories of facts and then reveal 
these findings as the basis for decisions, “[t]argeted information-disclosure 
regulation seeks to provide individuals with information that will steer their 
choices toward a particular desired regulatory outcome without explicitly 
 
7. See Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759 (2012). 
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mandating the outcome.”8 In other words, by specifying ex ante the type of 
information judges ought to consider in making certain procedural 
decisions, rulemakers can push judges towards desired outcomes without 
anticipating or specifying those outcomes in advance. This novel approach 
would require a significant restructuring of the relevant rules of civil 
procedure, and I model one example using Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I delves into the procedural 
problems that have resulted from the application of vague standards to 
managerial settings. Focusing on joinder, it describes how the current 
instability in the rules can be attributed to unresolved debates about the 
nature of managerial discretion and the balance between uniformity of 
outcomes and flexibility of judges. It then highlights how many of these 
problems are compounded by the fact that certain procedural devices are 
effectively insulated from meaningful appellate review. 
Part II explores the relationship between administrative law and 
procedure to show the utility of borrowing from administrative law to solve 
managerial problems in litigation. It then explores the foundations of the 
concept of “reason giving” in general as well as its uses in administrative 
law. 
Part III examines how a reason-giving requirement could function as a 
procedural rule by coupling an explicit delegation of discretion with a list 
of factors that judges must consider when rendering a decision and stating 
reasons. Using the Rule 15(c) “relation back” rule as an example, it 
demonstrates how the rule can be transformed from an amorphous 
“transaction or occurrence” rule into a vehicle for more sophisticated and 
transparent analysis that is uniform in process even if not always in 
outcome. Part III then argues that judges should be required to give reasons 
under these rules, however, it stops short of suggesting that the mandate 
involve a requirement of a written opinion. Part III concludes with a 
discussion of the role that appellate review can and should play in 
effectuating the reason-giving rules at the district court level. 
I. DIAGNOSING DEFICIENCIES IN PROCEDURAL RULES 
This Part builds a methodology for identifying the procedural rules and 
devices that have created unique problems that might be ameliorated by use 
of a reason-giving approach. Two competing impulses are found in the 
rules crafted to implement procedural devices: the desire to strictly regulate 
procedure via ex ante rules and the desire to craft devices that grant 
 
8. Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and 
Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1845 (2012). 
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generous flexibility and discretion. Some devices and rules fit one or the 
other model rather clearly. For others, however, these impulses clash.9 The 
reason I highlight this tension here is because I will argue that certain 
procedural devices ought to accommodate rather than resist the tension 
between regulation and discretion. 
A. The Tension Between Strict Rules and Judicial Flexibility 
Rules are used to implement substantive policy objectives. There is 
always a temporal and conceptual distance between the rulemakers who 
establish policy-implementing rules ex ante and the decisionmakers who 
apply these rules to concrete factual scenarios ex post. This gap is most 
evident in situations in which complex and unpredictable facts require 
creative and nuanced reasoning from a decisionmaker. Scholars typically 
characterize these trade-offs as part of the rules versus standards debate.10 
The role and scope of judicial flexibility is at the heart of this conflict, as is 
the value of uniformity and predictability in a dispute resolution system. In 
this sense, concerns about discretion are pervasive across almost all areas 
of law, including procedure. This tension between the benefits of ex ante 
rules specification and ex post decisionmaking is not susceptible to a 
unitary solution across all rules and procedural devices. However, reason-
giving rules are useful in a limited set of circumstances. 
This Part identifies these circumstances by presenting a spectrum of 
procedures that one might want to be governed by strict rules, and those 
which one might want to be subject to explicit grants of discretion. Two 
insights emerge from this inquiry. First, it becomes clear that certain 
procedural devices manifest a unique tension between a strict ex ante rule 
and a delegation of interpretive discretion. This tension is inherent in the 
judicial role as manager, and is a distinct problem from the general 
question of balancing the interests of ex ante rules and ex post standards. 
Second, confusion over the nature of discretion, that is, whether the 
discretion is for the purposes of interpreting and applying the rule, or 
whether the discretion is for the purposes of maintaining managerial 
flexibility, has led to instability and confusion in the law. This part 
 
9. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 
U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1977 (1989) (noting the “inconsistency . . . between the goal of uniformity and the 
goal of flexibility”). 
10. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 140–42 (1991) (discussing the trade-off 
between allowing individuals to better predict the application of rules and ensuring that rules are able to 
effectively adapt to change); Diver, supra note 3, at 70 (examining the trade-offs in regulatory 
rulemaking between transparency, accessibility, and congruency); Kaplow, supra note 3, at 577 
(discussing the relative desirability of ex ante versus ex post promulgation of rules). 
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identifies these tensions and difficulties in order to highlight the limited but 
important set of rules that may benefit from a reason-giving approach. 
1. Procedure Without Discretion: The Argument for Strict Rules 
The arguments for legislating through strict rules instead of flexible 
standards to govern a given area of law are familiar. Most justifications for 
strict rules boil down to the fact that highly predictable rules are easy for 
decisionmakers to apply. Aside from these general arguments favoring 
strict ex ante rules, there are four arguments why some procedural devices 
should be crafted as rules with limited (or even no) discretion for the judge.  
a. Coordination of Basic Procedures 
 Non-discretionary rules provide the modest yet valuable service of 
simplification through coordination. Rather than reinventing the procedural 
wheel for each and every case or litigant, some rules dictate the standard 
baseline technicalities by which courts will operate. For example, 
standardized document formats ensure that the judge and other parties are, 
quite literally, reading from the same page. The benefits of using strict 
rules to coordinate procedures are limited in value, and are easily 
outweighed by other policy concerns such as the need for judicial 
discretion or the benefits of local innovation. Departures from the 
applications of strict procedural rules are rarely bothersome so long as they 
are accompanied by sufficient notice and an assurance that such a departure 
does not leave another party at a disadvantage. 
Extensive and rigid coordination efforts have been used before to 
address the ills of a procedural system. The old nineteenth century writ 
system developed, in part, to provide a strict and formal structure,11 but the 
rigidity of the system led to a situation in which seemingly arbitrary 
distinctions and errors in classification took on a life of their own and 
overwhelmed the judiciary’s ability to adjudicate the merits of a given 
dispute.12 Nevertheless, the creation of a unified body of procedural rules 
for the federal system was considered a major achievement because of its 
coordination benefits.13 Thus, it suggests that rulemakers will favor strict 
 
11. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1035–42 
(1982); G. Edward White, The Intellectual Origins of Torts in America, 86 YALE L.J. 671, 678 (1977) 
(The 19th century writ system “became increasingly haphazard as a classification device.”). 
12. White, supra note 11, at 681–82. 
13. Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 
698–99 (2010) (describing creation of transsubstantive rules); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local 
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1999, 2002–04 (1989) [hereinafter Subrin, Federal Rules]; Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of 
Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. 
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rules to coordinate procedure when the task is easily accomplished but will 
not insist on a costly or complicated system of rigid rules merely for the 
sake of coordination. 
b. Litigant Equality 
Consistency of outcomes (and the attendant predictability) achieves a 
certain degree of equality among and between litigants.14 Concerned that 
differences among procedural rules “would bestow significant ‘substantive’ 
advantages on a litigant as compared to how that litigant would fare”15 in a 
different forum, many have noted that a party’s litigation opportunities 
should not be subject to the unchecked whims and idiosyncrasies of a 
random decisionmaker such that similarly situated parties are given roughly 
the same opportunities to build a case or defense before a tribunal.16 
Litigant equality, however, is not an unlimited principle in American 
jurisprudence. Although inconsistent outcomes under similar circumstances 
might be viewed as a symptom of unfair procedure and something that 
violates an intuitive sense of fairness,17 the American system openly 
accepts and even invites variation in the procedural and substantive rules 
that apply to litigants.18 Despite the availability of different jurisdictions 
with different substantive and procedural rules, echoes of the harms of 
litigant inequality persist. Litigants who take advantage of procedural 
differences between different courts are accused of “forum shopping.”19 
While litigant equality may appear to be a core concern motivating 
 
L. REV. 377 (2010) (summarizing and critiquing scholarly and judicial arguments for transsubstantive 
procedural rules). 
14. See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1865, 1893 (2002) (“If a dispute resolution system processes similar cases to disparate outcomes, 
there is something wrong with the process.”). 
15. Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (1991). 
16. The value of litigant equality here refers to equal treatment as between similarly situated 
litigants. Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 1892; see also Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of 
Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1645 (1998) (The concept of litigant equality is “that like 
cases ought to be treated alike.”). A different concept of litigant equality, “the fair allocation of power 
among litigants” who are parties in the same litigation, is also an important procedural value, although 
not one that I consider here concerning the uniformity of rules. Note, Collateral Estoppel and 
Nonacquiescence: Precluding Government Relitigation in the Pursuit of Litigant Equality, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 847, 852 (1986). 
17. See Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 1893. 
18. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 643–46 (1981) (exploring the advantages and disadvantages 
of concurrent jurisdictions for purposes of dispute resolution and norm articulation); Subrin, Federal 
Rules, supra note 13, at 2020 (discussing the proliferation of local procedural rules). 
19. Horizontal forum shopping—choosing from among different states—is tolerated as an 
acknowledged feature of our federal system, see Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990), 
whereas vertical forum shopping—choosing between state and federal courts—is frowned upon in 
diversity jurisdiction cases. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 642–43 (1964). 
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momentous procedural decisions such as Erie, that principle is limited by 
the fact that Erie was really about the role of federal courts in adjudicating 
state law claims and not about making broader arguments for litigant 
equality across the board.20 
Litigant equality thus tells us something about the need for uniformity 
within certain jurisdictional boundaries,21 but it does not tell us anything 
about the ideal size of the jurisdictional unit within which uniformity 
should be achieved. Intuitions of justice and fairness point to basic litigant 
equality on an intrasystem rather than intersystem level and suggest the 
importance of transsubstantive rules of procedure. These considerations, 
however, do not concern equality of constitutional proportions.22 Moreover, 
the value of litigant equality involves the operation of other ideals aside 
from uniformity of rules, most notably resource inequities and disparity in 
access to effective counsel.23 
Therefore litigant equality is an unconvincing reason for utilizing strict 
rules to regulate procedure. First, as shown above, the value of litigant 
equality is surprisingly weak, given initial intuitions about the role of 
equality in procedural justice. Second, even to the extent that the value of 
litigant equality holds some sway, it must be balanced against the costs of 
using rigid rules. The best that might be said for the value of litigant 
equality in procedure is that uniformity is a lofty goal.  However, it is not 
one that, in and of itself, calls for the unquestioned use of strict rules. 
Recognition of this fact clears the path for greater comfort with procedural 
rules that grant broad discretion to trial judges. 
c. Predictability  
To the extent that strict rules produce uniform and consistent 
outcomes,24 the use of such rules may be favored for their ability to 
 
20. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1964) (stating that the “twin aims” of Erie include the 
“discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws”) (citing 
Erie v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938)); see Freer, supra note 16, at 1644–46. 
21. Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 1885 (describing “trans-venue equality”). 
22. Id. at 1886–90; Patrick Woolley, The Sources of Federal Preclusion Law After Semtek, 72 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 527, 531 (2003) (discussing the non-constitutional nature of the Erie value of litigant 
equality). 
23. Rubenstein, supra note 14, at 1881 (“Procedural rules governing party status can also 
indirectly reduce equipage disparities.”). Equality might also clash with other procedural values, such as 
party autonomy. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Case for “Trial by Formula,” 90 TEX. L. REV. 571, 574 
(2012) (In complex litigation, “[t]he Supreme Court has consistently favored the liberty of individual 
adjudication over equality.”); see also Frederic M. Bloom, Information Lost and Found, 100 CALIF. L. 
REV. 635, 668 (2012) (stating that procedural equality implicates a “system’s commitment to equalized 
information” among litigants). 
24. However, as one prominent scholar has observed, “[t]here is little that is simple or predictable 
about contemporary federal procedure.” Stephen P. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme 
Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 715 (1988). 
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promote predictability. Predictable rules allow litigants to structure their 
affairs, both in terms of the consequences of substantive law and the 
procedural rules that will govern possible litigation.25 
Like the value of litigant equality, the value of predictability is not 
absolute. Perfectly predictable rules often run afoul of equitable notions of 
a “fair” or “correct” result because the rigidity required for perfect 
predictability would render many rules either over- or under-inclusive. To 
this end, scholars and jurists have wrestled with the general problem of 
how to craft predictable and transparent rules that simultaneously ensure 
equitable and context-sensitive results. Rules for procedural devices, 
however, have an added wrinkle. The operation of some devices can 
deprive a party of the ability to assert or defend against a claim, thus 
heightening the urgency to provide a predictable framework for such 
procedural devices. 
These “claim-determinative” devices are instrumental in ensuring that a 
party can predict whether application of a given procedural rule will block 
his ability to assert a claim or a defense to a claim. The motion to dismiss 
and summary judgment are the most obvious examples of devices that 
affect a party’s ability to assert a claim or defense.26 Other devices also 
share this quality such as res judicata and the rules that act in its service. 
Because losing the ability to assert a claim in a future action is a grave 
consequence, these rules ideally should reduce uncertainty about whether a 
future action will be barred.27 
Some devices might be described as “quasi-claim-determinative.” For 
example, certification of a class is, for all practical purposes, a prerequisite 
for claimants with negative expected value claims to bring a lawsuit.28 
Uncertainty about the nature of a device such as a class action can show up 
both in the text of a rule and its application, and this unsettled state of 
affairs does a disservice to the development and use of the device. 
A lack of predictable claim-determinative rules implicates the broader 
value of court access and administration of justice. In other words, suppose 
that any given procedural device could become perfectly transparent and 
predictable, if only we had the proper judicial resources to contribute to the 
effort. This clearly would be the best result, especially assuming that 
perfect transparency and predictability would not interfere with equitable 
 
25. But cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 6 cmt. C (1971). 
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
27. The Supreme Court has wrestled with the value of uniformity of preclusion law. See Semtek 
Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001) (requiring federal district courts to 
adopt the preclusion rules of the state in which they sit is more compatible with Erie’s demands of 
uniformity). 
28. See Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 694–95 
(2005). Additionally, certification all but ensures a quick settlement of large claims; Peter H. Schuck, 
Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 941, 958 (1995). 
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concerns. In a world of scarce judicial resources, it is the claim-
determinative rules that are most deserving of this attention. 
d. Structural Concerns 
The category of structural concerns addresses broader concerns of 
whether and how uniformity should be used to further the interests of a 
system of dispute resolution and its place in a larger polity. 
Rules of jurisdiction embody some of these concerns. To the extent that 
they allocate authority among and between sovereigns and guarantee 
certain aspects of due process to litigants, jurisdictional rules implicate 
structural and political concerns that demand uniform treatment of parties 
or uniform baselines of conduct. Both constitutional and legislatively 
enacted subject matter jurisdictional boundaries implicate weighty, 
overarching principles that receive frequent congressional attention and 
regular policing by district, appellate, and Supreme Court opinions.29 
Similarly, federal and state courts, as well as state legislatures, pay frequent 
and intense attention to the rules and boundaries of personal jurisdiction.30 
Although courts and commentators prize clear and uniform rules of 
jurisdiction,31 this project has been largely aspirational. With the exception 
of a few decisions delineating clear interpretations of isolated parts of 
statutes governing subject matter jurisdiction,32 the Supreme Court has 
been notoriously unable to craft jurisdictional rules with clear and 
predictable applications, despite strenuous exhortations to the need for such 
clarity.33 Other structural devices such as standing suffer from similar 
problems.34 For now, it is sufficient to note that areas of structural concern 
 
29. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (defining a corporation’s principal place 
of business under the diversity jurisdiction statute); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 
U.S. 546 (2005) (interpreting the relationship of the supplemental jurisdiction statute and the diversity 
jurisdiction statute). 
30. See 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067 (3d ed. 2010). 
31. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) 
(arguing that uniformity and clarity are fundamental objectives of federal jurisdictional rules); Martha 
A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 683, 683 (1981) 
(discussing “the importance of clarity in rules governing courts’ jurisdiction”). 
32. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93 (resolving circuit split over the principal place of business for a 
corporation in favor of the “nerve center” test); Carden v. Arkoma, 494 U.S. 185 (1990) (diversity 
jurisdiction statute referring to corporations does not cover business associations that are not 
corporations). 
33. See Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 993–1007 (2009) 
(describing incoherence in several jurisdictional doctrines); Adam N. Steinman, The Meaning of 
McIntyre, 18 SW. J. INT’L LAW 417, 438–41 (2012) (describing the lack of clarity and majority opinions 
in recent personal jurisdiction cases). 
34. See Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 
171 (2011) (“At the most basic level, standing doctrine is confusing and unpredictable.”); William A. 
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are ones in which consistency and predictability are sought, if not 
necessarily achieved. Although this Article does not focus on designing 
rules for jurisdictional devices, this category is still of particular importance 
because of the interaction between jurisdiction and the operation of certain 
procedural devices like compulsory counterclaims or joinder of parties. 
That is, the structural concerns of jurisdictional devices can add another 
element favoring regulation to otherwise “managerial” procedural devices. 
The push and pull between the appeal of strict procedural rules with 
consistent outcomes and the realities of the costs and practical difficulties 
of such rules are reflected in the different attitudes that rulemakers take 
toward crafting the rules that implement procedural devices. While there 
are some rules in which consistency is deliberately subordinated to other 
procedural values, in other instances, the extent to which uniformity should 
be enforced or imposed is either unstated or clearly aspirational. It is in 
these situations that tensions in interpreting and applying procedural rules 
can arise. Although judicial discretion is not the only procedural value to 
compete with uniformity, it looms large in the debate, and is considered 
below. 
2.  Procedural Devices for Which a High Degree of Judicial 
Flexibility is Desirable 
The concept of judicial discretion extends beyond the procedural realm. 
Discretion’s role in the creation, interpretation, and application of 
substantive law is acknowledged as much as it is debated.35 What 
distinguishes these arguments as they are applied to procedural devices is 
that judicial discretion plays a particular procedural role with regard to 
procedural devices.36 
 
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 221 (1988) (“The structure of standing law in the 
federal courts has long been criticized as incoherent.”). 
35. See Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of 
Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947, 955 (2010) (any amount of flexibility in a substantive rule of law 
allows for “considerable manipulation” through judicial discretion); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 345 (1990) (exercise 
of judicial discretion in statutory interpretation involves creating substantive policy); Richard L. 
Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1568 (2003) (arguing that the 
American common law method restrains substantive judicial discretion, which should be a comfort to 
opponents of greater judicial discretion); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal 
Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40 (1985) (discussing “delegated lawmaking”—when a statute or the 
Constitution gives courts authority to develop substantive law through incremental common law 
evolution); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive 
Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 793–94 (1989) (arguing against 
substantive policymaking by courts under the guise of statutory interpretation). 
36. See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971) (distinguishing between primary and secondary discretion); see 
also Bone, supra note 5, at 1967–69 (describing sources of authority for the exercise of procedural 
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Procedural theorists have expressed differing views of the value of 
judicial discretion. Commentators applaud judicial discretion when it gives 
judges the power to manage cases and leverage their experience to tailor 
procedure to the needs of each unique case before the court.37 Some 
scholars have questioned whether judicial discretion is, in fact, a useful 
tool.38 Others have blamed the use of judicial discretion for producing 
erratic and unpredictable results.39 Trial court judicial discretion has a 
special procedural function because of the judge’s role in case 
management.40 
Trial court judges are tasked with administering lawsuits. Even cases 
that are not officially the stuff of complex litigation can be multi-party, 
multi-claim affairs that require managerial attention from the trial judge. To 
this end, some modern procedural devices have been crafted to imbue trial 
judges with “broad discretion to deal fairly with the case at hand.”41 Many 
of these devices have been fashioned by judges themselves, either through 
judicial ruling or through the federal rulemaking process, thus judicial 
 
discretion). Certain procedural issues, such as jurisdiction, might also benefit from enhancing or 
contracting trial court discretion. See Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and 
Standards to Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 507, 533–37 (2012). 
37. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 5, at 1970 (discussing the importance of procedural discretion); 
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 412 (2007) (discussing the 
inevitability of discretion in judicial decisionmaking); Marcus, supra note 35, at 1605–15 (expressing 
“guarded optimism” about the trend toward greater discretion); Rosenberg, supra note 36, at 662 
(conferring judicial discretion is necessary because of the impossibility of designing a rule addressing 
any issue that might arise); Charles M. Yablon, Justifying the Judge’s Hunch: An Essay on Discretion, 
41 HASTINGS L.J. 231, 262 (1990) (discussing the justifications for judicial discretion). 
38. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 5, at 1963 (“The pervasive assumption that expert trial judges can 
do a good job of tailoring procedures to individual cases is empirically unsupported and at best highly 
questionable.”). 
39. See Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 76 (1995) (Increased discretion leads to “arbitrary and 
discriminatory behavior.”); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 426–27 (1982) 
(Broad judicial discretion in case management threatens judges’ impartiality.); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 
1995 (arguing that unconstrained discretion can be harmful and lead to abuse of power by judges); Jay 
Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 558 (2006). 
40. See Resnik, supra note 39, at 386–91. 
41. Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1975; see also Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a 
Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 80 (1989) (“The federal rule drafters . . . relied to a large extent on trial judge discretion to 
shape optimal lawsuit structure for each dispute.”); Burbank, supra, note 24 at 715 (“[T]he trend of 
modern procedural law has been away from rules that make policy choices towards those that confer on 
trial courts a substantial amount of normative discretion.”); Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to 
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2081–85 (1989) (describing the “procedural flexibility” in 
the FRCP); Gensler, supra note 13, at 674 (“Today, active judicial case management is a defining 
characteristic of the federal civil pretrial scheme.”); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and 
Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429, 473 (2003) (“The Federal Rules reflected a 
philosophy that the discretion of individual judges, rather than mandatory and prohibitory rules of 
procedure, could manage the scope and breadth and complexity of federal lawsuits better than rigid 
rules.”). 
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preferences are often reflected in the text of the rule as well as in their 
interpretation.42 
One example of such a procedural device is the pretrial conference. 
Although the scope of district judges’ powers has been more precisely 
defined under the modern instantiation of Rule 16,43 it is still a tool of great 
flexibility and discretion for a judge to shape the course of litigation. It 
continues the “tradition of discretion—of authorizing a range of actions but 
not requiring them.”44 The rule makes “case management an express goal 
of pretrial procedure.”45 It authorizes judges to hold one (or more) pretrial 
conferences during which she can set the schedule for motions and 
discovery, discuss and set the scope of discovery, discuss the possibility of 
settlement, and somewhat more controversially, actively engage the parties 
in settlement negotiations.46 The rule stipulates that the terms of the order 
“may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent,”47 
ensuring that the judge retains flexibility and discretion over the shape of 
the case as it unfolds during the pretrial phase. In fact, the decision to hold 
a pretrial conference at all is totally discretionary, and the judge may decide 
simply to issue a pretrial order.48 Because the matters to be discussed at a 
pretrial conference are within the judge’s discretion, the judge can focus on 
matters most important to each case without expending court resources on 
extraneous matters. Rule 16 is thus a model of a rule that grants judicial 
discretion. Although it is not unconstrained, it is the hallmark of a regime 
in which judges are given broad authority to manage the cases before them 
without undue ex ante rule interference. Indeed, it is meant to work in 
tandem with other managerial tools such as joinder and discovery.49 
 
42. See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 628 (1994) (“Because procedural rules are designed to facilitate judicial 
administration, judges are given considerable leeway to craft such rules to conform to their 
preferences.”). Judicial discretion is also connected with the idea of the inherent powers of district 
judges. See generally Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 87 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 311 (2010). 
43. See Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1981–85. 
44. Id. at 1985. 
45. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 1521 (emphasis added). 
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A), (B); see also MAURICE ROSENBERG, The PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE: A CONTROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION 5–11 
(1964) (discussing the role of pretrial conferences generally and in federal court); David A. Rammelt, 
Note, “Inherent Power” and Rule 16: How Far Can a Federal Court Push the Litigant Toward 
Settlement?, 65 IND. L.J. 965, 981–85 (1990) (describing use of Rule 16 in judicial management of 
settlement negotiations); Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1989 (discussing Rule 16 and “the authority of judges 
to nudge, or shove, the parties toward settlement”). 
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). 
48. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 30, § 1524. 
49. Id. § 1522 (“Rule 16 also serves as an essential adjunct of the joinder and pleading provisions 
in the federal rules.”). 
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Rule 16 is an example of a federal rule that does confer varying 
amounts of discretion to district judges.  However, it does not capture any 
normative conclusions about whether judges should have procedural 
discretion or how wide that discretion should be. Commentators differ 
sharply in their assessments of the wisdom and utility of granting trial 
judges broad managerial powers.50 Thus, it would be a mistake to make an 
argument premised on some sort of a shared notion of the types of devices 
for which a high degree of procedural judicial discretion is desirable. 
There is, however, a way in which thinking about the desirability of 
discretion can be helpful. Whether or not commentators ultimately will 
ever agree on an optimal level of discretion, judging on the ground will 
continue to follow its own course. The stage has been set for a managerial 
model of adjudication. Short of an outright ban on a particular practice, 
judges will manage cases in a way that manifests a certain amount of 
discretion. Even in the face of stated limitations, “experience with the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure confirms [that] federal judges do not react 
well to rules that limit their discretion.”51 
3.  The Intersection of Regulation and Discretion 
There is an inevitable tension between strict rules and flexible 
discretion. This tension is particularly acute when the value of flexibility is 
connected as much to the management of a lawsuit as it is to the flexibility 
to accommodate a range of factual situations under the rubric of a single 
standard. This Subpart focuses on how that tension arises in certain 
procedural devices, using joinder as an example. 
Some joinder devices manifest this tension when the rulemakers craft 
written rules that do not appear to grant discretion to trial judges but 
nonetheless are often described by both courts and commentators as if they 
were discretionary.52 That is, although the wording of a rule that requires a 
“transaction or occurrence” conveys a standard, and thus a healthy degree 
of interpretive discretion, some judges treat the standard itself as if it were 
optional, discarding the standard when it seems expedient or equitable.53 
Viewed in isolation, the “transaction or occurrence” standard does not 
appear to be ambiguous concerning a grant of explicit discretion.54 
 
50. See, e.g., Gensler, supra note 13 (discussing existing debate over case management and 
discretion and advocating for a stronger case management system). 
51. Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 
ALA. L. REV. 221, 238 (1997). 
52. Effron, supra note 7, at 776. 
53. Id. 
54. To the extent that the language of the standard itself is vague, it represents a deliberate 
delegation of interpretive discretion. See Bone, supra note 5, at 1970. 
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However, the provenance of the text sheds light on why the rule has been 
treated as creating such broad discretion. The “transaction or occurrence” 
language in the rule predates the FRCP. In fact, the word “transaction” 
came directly from the former Equity Rule 30,55 and twelve years before 
the advent of the FRCP, the Supreme Court used Equity Rule 30 to 
formulate the “transaction or occurrence” standard for counterclaims 
falling within a federal court’s ancillary (now supplemental) jurisdiction.56 
When the Advisory Committee incorporated substantially all of Equity 
Rule 30 into rules such as Rule 13(a), 15(c), and 20,57 it tied the text of a 
mandatory rule to the inherent flexibility of the equitable tradition.58 Thus, 
in addition to broader intentions to structure the FRCP to foster flexibility 
in judicial management of cases, the text of the rule itself is deeply 
connected with equitable practice. Herein lies the tension—the rulemakers 
have sought to set a uniform standard for a rule, but have used language 
from an equitable rule associated with case-by-case adjudication and 
judicial discretion. The text of the transaction or occurrence standard, then, 
captures the clash between strict rules and judicial flexibility, but crafting 
the rule in this way has done little to resolve the tension, and instead has 
created a doctrine that many consider unworkable. 
Historical development of the text of the joinder rules provides only a 
partial explanation for this conflict. Thus, replacing the current standards 
with “better standards” is only a partial solution.59 The primary source of 
tension is in the nature of the devices themselves. A comparison of two 
joinder devices, the amendment of a pleading to include an otherwise time-
barred claim (“relation back”) under Rule 15(c), and compulsory 
counterclaims under Rule 13(a) demonstrates how this tension exists and 
how it differs across devices. The analysis will show that both rules are 
examples of this tension, but that the degree and quality of the tension are 
not equal. Each device presents its own challenges. 
There are good reasons that both relation back and compulsory 
counterclaims should be governed by relatively strict rules. A litigant 
should be able to determine with some certainty whether or not she will 
lose the ability to bring a claim in a future action or an amended pleading. 
Likewise, unpredictable applications of these rules dilute the value of 
repose to defendants that res judicata and statutes of limitations are meant 
to provide. The claim for uniformity in the text, interpretation, and 
application of the compulsory counterclaims is particularly strong because 
 
55. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1401 (3d ed. 2010). 
56. See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609–10 (1926). 
57. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) advisory committee’s note 1. 
58. See Subrin, supra note 1, at 922. 
59. Effron, supra note 7, at 812. 
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existence (or lack) of a compulsory counterclaim may be used to obtain 
subject matter jurisdiction,60 thus implicating the structural value of 
federalism. 
On the other hand, both compulsory counterclaims and relation back 
are also contexts in which judicial flexibility is prized. At a minimum, both 
devices need the interpretive discretion found in a broad standard insofar as 
they require a judge to make factually-laden and context-specific 
determinations, and to proceed best on a case-by-case basis. This, however, 
does not distinguish the procedural device of counterclaims from any other 
determination—procedural or substantive—that a court must make that 
depends heavily on facts. 
Beyond this ordinary need for flexibility in fact-intensive cases, joinder 
devices implicate a special type of discretion and flexibility: the case 
management functions of the judge. As outlined above, judicial discretion 
is particularly favored when it is used in service of managing and shaping 
litigation.61 Both counterclaims and amended pleadings are intimately tied 
to case management, insofar as they affect the size and scope of a trial as 
well as pretrial motions and discovery. The decision to add extra claims to 
a lawsuit is one that turns on whether or not the two claims make a sensible 
litigation unit.62 A trial judge has special expertise in exactly these facts—
when does it make sense to require claims to be litigated together? 
This special knowledge is more than just an expertise in procedural 
law. Take, for example, decisions over minimum contacts in personal 
jurisdiction. These are also highly fact-specific inquiries. The facts at issue, 
however, ultimately have little to do with anything that will happen inside 
the courthouse walls. Instead, they are almost exclusively about a party’s 
actions regarding the facts of the cause of action itself.63 Compulsory 
counterclaims and relation back, on the other hand, concern facts about the 
cause of action and how these facts will affect the litigation of the claims. It 
is this connection about which judges have special expertise, and this 
expertise might warrant a more deferential stance towards judicial 
discretion. 
Thus, the tension between strict rules and flexible discretion is a feature 
of the devices of amended pleadings and compulsory counterclaims and not 
 
60. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 1414. 
61. Although Resnik and others are wary of managerial judging, I take its presence and use in 
litigation as a given, both because it reflects present realities of how courts operate, and because 
rulemakers have explicitly promoted these values. My argument attempts to account for such values, 
rather than reconsider their utility. 
62. This decision can take the form of a strict ex ante rule that a plaintiff can join any claims, 
related or unrelated (Rule 18), or the ex post rules discussed here for counterclaims and relation back 
that require a more nuanced analysis. 
63. Or, in a general jurisdiction case, the facts at issue are about a party’s basic activities in the 
forum. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011). 
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just a feature of the particular drafting of the current Rules 13(a) or 15(c). 
Accepting that relation back is a useful procedural device and accepting 
that it exemplifies an inherent clash between uniformity and discretion, the 
question then becomes how rulemakers can avoid exacerbating this tension 
when designing the directive. By turning to the tools of reason giving, 
rulemakers could do a better job of crafting rules that leverage this 
expertise rather than allowing inconsistent decisions to evolve into 
incoherent doctrine under the guise of discretion and case-by-case 
decisionmaking. 
The examples I have given demonstrate that the managerial veneer of 
litigation produces a special tension between rules and discretion, but that 
these tensions manifest differently across different devices. Notice, for 
example, that Rule 15(c) decisions are almost always prospective; that is, 
the decision to allow a party to add an otherwise time-barred claim affects 
the shape and scope of ongoing litigation. Decisions regarding compulsory 
counterclaims, however, are sometimes retrospective, meaning that the 
judge will not actually be consolidating or shaping the scope of the first 
lawsuit but will only decide whether or not to bar a subsequent claim. Thus, 
one might have different reactions to the tension between strict rules and 
flexibility in each of these cases. Because of the urgency of the res judicata 
problem in compulsory counterclaims and the asynchronous nature of the 
assertion of the claims, the argument for accommodating both uniformity 
and an explicit grant of discretion within the same rule is weaker for Rule 
13(a) than it is for Rule 15(c). These differences will affect whether (and 
how) a reason-giving approach is an appropriate solution to the current 
problems in the rules. 
B.  Procedural Devices Insulated from Meaningful Appellate Review 
Many trial court procedural decisions are structurally insulated from 
appellate review,64 and this fact contributes to the deficiencies in certain 
procedural rules such as some of the joinder devices. These decisions are 
made during the intermediate stages of litigation, meaning that, by the time 
a final judgment65 has been rendered and the case is eligible for appeal, 
 
64. In addition to the structural barriers to appellate review, some procedural decisions are 
unreviewable by operation of statute or rule. See Andrew S. Pollis, Civil Rule 54(b): Seventy-Five and 
Ready for Retirement, 65 FLA. L. REV. 711, 718 (2013); see also Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884, 891 
(2011) (“Ordinarily, orders denying summary judgment do not qualify as ‘final decisions’ subject to 
appeal.”). 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). According to the Supreme Court, a decision of a district court is 
final when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the 
judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
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many procedural issues have fallen away and parties do not appeal them 
with a meaningful degree of frequency.66 
In response to the difficulties posed by the complexities of 
interlocutory review doctrine, numerous commentators have critiqued the 
doctrine and proposed reforms to the rules of finality and appealability.67 
Despite the difficulties that this doctrine causes, courts and commentators 
have articulated reasons for the final judgment rule. Litigation can proceed 
more smoothly and efficiently if it is free from the constant interruption 
and delay of appellate review.68 Moreover, just as joining claims and 
parties before a trial court saves parties and judges from the costs of 
duplicative litigation, the final judgment rule acts as a type of appellate 
joinder device, saving the parties from multiple appellate proceedings.69 
This Article approaches the interlocutory review problem from a 
different angle by examining how the design of procedural rules can 
anticipate and accommodate dampened appellate review. Reason giving, 
while not a replacement for appellate review, can buttress the functions of 
law statement and error correction in situations where these are likely to be 
missing. 
Certain types of procedural devices are often the subjects of decisions 
that do not dispose of a case on the merits.70 The final judgment rule does 
 
66. This Subpart focuses primarily on the federal systems. A few states have notable exceptions 
to the final judgment rule, such as New York which permits regular and broad interlocutory appeals 
during litigation. See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 526 (4th ed. 2005); 12 JACK B. 
WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L. KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE: C.P.L.R. § 5701 
(LexisNexis 2d ed.). 
67. See Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine: A New “Serbonian Bog” and Four 
Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539 (1998) (proposing modifications to the collateral order 
doctrine); Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 423, 423 (2013) (“[J]udicial treatment [of interlocutory appellate review is] so inconsistent that 
the regime is too complicated and too unpredictable.”); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and 
Appealability by Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 787–89 (1993) 
(summarizing the history, problems, and proposed solutions to the final judgment rule); Andrew S. 
Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1643 (2011) (arguing for non-discretionary interlocutory review of certain decisions 
in multidistrict litigation); Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in Federal 
Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89 (1975) (suggesting a pragmatic approach to interlocutory review); 
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right to Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219 (2013); Adam N. Steinman, 
Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237 (2007) (proposing two reforms to simplify the 
doctrine of interlocutory appeals). 
68. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal Court: A 
Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 733, 738 (2006). 
69. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006). For criticisms of this position see Paul D. 
Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 
1984, at 165, 165 (criticizing the arguments against piecemeal appeals). But see Redish, supra note 67 
(explaining the need for a flexible approach to balance the interests of efficiency and error correction); 
Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Summer 1984, at 171, 171–73. 
70. Moreover, the “collateral order” doctrine does not operate to ameliorate this problem because 
they do not meet the third part of a standard that requires that the district court order “be effectively 
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not, by itself, form an impermeable barrier to review of intermediate 
orders.71 Even if litigants must wait until a final judgment has been 
rendered, they often appeal many orders, such as key evidentiary rulings, 
because of the importance of the issues to the ongoing interests of the 
parties. Although a procedural ruling might not directly affect the merits, 
other pressing interests, such as protection of privileged information, can 
propel a party toward an appeal.72 
Some issues, however, fall by the wayside by the time a court renders a 
final judgment because they are effectively moot.73 Decisions about 
permissive joinder of parties are one example. Suppose, for example, that 
after a fire in an apartment building, several property owners sue their 
respective insurance companies for denials of coverage under identical 
policy clauses. They file a lawsuit together in federal court using 
permissive joinder under Rule 20. The district court denies the motion for 
permissive joinder on the basis that the different policies are not part of the 
same “transaction or occurrence” as required by Rule 20. Although they 
had hoped to benefit from the cost-saving of coordination, each plaintiff 
has a positive expected value claim, and thus the parties proceed separately 
with their own actions. By the time that an appeal of the Rule 20 decision 
would be available, all of the parties have either litigated their claim to 
judgment or settled74 with the defendant. The appeal thus never 
materializes. 
The lack of meaningfully available appellate review of certain 
procedural devices has two consequences. First, it can be frustrating to 
 
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 
(1978). 
71. As a technical matter, a party can appeal many procedural decisions, even if, as a practical 
matter, it no longer has an incentive to do so. Moreover, interlocutory appeals are permitted in a small 
number of situations. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (permitting appeal of an order granting or denying class 
certification). 
72. The hardships caused by such disclosure are sometimes large enough that courts will (or 
should) grant interlocutory appeal of the issue. See Robertson, supra note 67. 
73. See Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1182 (1990) (“[D]iscovery disputes, a judge’s management of a case, or denials 
of motions to dismiss on venue grounds, all may evade review even if the disgruntled party also loses 
the final judgment.”); Steinman, supra note 67, at 1241 (“Under [the FRCP], strict adherence to the 
final judgment rule might not allow for meaningful appellate review of the trial court decisions that 
really matter.”); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 
WIS. L. REV. 631, 661 (FRCP pretrial procedures are “a set of lower court rulings that, while often 
significant, were as likely as not to be unreviewable.”). 
74. Settlement also affects appellate review of issues in a world of interlocutory review. Many 
cases end in settlement rather than judgment, and therefore any intermediate orders issued before 
settlement are not appealed. See Yeazell, supra note 73, at 661–62 (around 70% of cases are 
unappealable on account of settlement). This affects procedural issues and non-procedural issues 
equally, and thus it is unlikely that settlement itself places a special burden on procedural orders. 
Nonetheless, it does contribute to a narrowed pool of appealable orders, especially to the extent that 
procedural decisions can affect parties’ incentives to settle. 
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litigants. At its worst, decisions that are tantamount to “‘unreviewable 
discretion’ . . . conflict[] with litigants’ basic sense of fairness and 
undermines societal trust in the judicial process.”75 Additionally, the lack of 
appellate review impedes the common law development of legal rules that 
one would normally expect in the American system. Incorporating a 
reason-giving element into procedural devices that are insulated from 
appellate review may be one strategy for ameliorating these difficulties. 
First, these rules address the problem of the appearance of 
unreviewable discretion. Models of reason-giving rules in administrative 
law developed, in part, as a response to the problem of delegated 
discretion.76 Such rules derive legitimacy primarily from their process 
rather than their outcome. Thus, a reason-giving model would impose a 
structure on these procedural devices that would assure litigants and 
observers that these procedural areas are subject to transparent and 
organized principles rather than opaque and less predictable actions of 
individual judges.77 
Second, reason-giving rules (whether appealable or not) would begin to 
fill in the interstices of procedural doctrines that are insulated from regular 
or robust law-stating function of the appellate courts. A lack of common 
law development is not necessarily a problem in and of itself. Plenty of 
legal systems use means other than lengthy judicial opinions as the primary 
means to promulgate and develop legal rules,78 and our own system is 
replete with examples of decisions without opinions,79 or opinions that are 
explicitly excluded from the world of binding precedent.80 The difficulty 
arises when rulemakers assume that all rules are subject to the same 
process of common law development when, in fact, that may not be true. 
Professor Yeazell has referred to this “striking result” as an “experiment in 
judicial decentralization and deregulation.”81 If the purpose of appeals is to 
 
75. Robertson, supra note 68, at 741; see also Pollis, supra note 67, at 1648 (discussing the value 
of access to appellate review). 
76. See infra Part II.B. 
77. The important caveat here is that reason-giving rules can go only so far in improving the 
current situation insofar as reason-giving rules themselves depend on appellate review in order to be 
effective. I address this particular concern infra at Part III, suggesting that the addition of some process 
is a significant improvement in and of itself, and that one might consider constructing a method of very 
limited interlocutory appeal with a high standard of review to enforce these rules that does not 
unnecessarily slow or interrupt litigation. 
78. See Phillipe Bruno, The Common Law from a Civil Lawyer’s Perspective, in INTRODUCTION 
TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS 1, 8 (Richard A. Danner & Marie-Louise H. Bernal eds., 1994). 
79. See Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 1395, 1396 
(2000) (discussing the Supreme Court’s somewhat regular practice of issuing decisions without 
opinions). 
80. See Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1235 (2004) (describing authoritative status of unpublished opinions). 
81. Yeazell, supra note 73, at 662. 
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“to correct errors; to develop legal principles; and to tie geographically 
dispersed lower courts into a unified, authoritative legal system,”82 then one 
must explore what happens when this goes missing in a particular area of 
the law. 
The difficulties emerge in the way that procedural rules are 
promulgated, interpreted, and applied. The job of the rulemaker is to draft 
legal rules which then govern the resolution of future disputes. Once a rule 
exists, judges must decide how and when to apply it to new and changing 
factual situations. In a common law precedential system, these decisions of 
law are subject to review by appeals courts. Over time, the binding 
opinions form the nuanced network of rules and standards that govern 
particular areas. Thus, one “principal value of appellate proceedings 
is . . . to formulate rules of law.”83 The faulty assumption is that just 
because the method of a promulgation for a body of rules (such as the 
FRCP) is uniform, so too would be the availability of appellate review. 
Of course, simply establishing a system that includes appellate review 
with appellate courts that have law-stating powers does not ensure the 
smooth and inevitable development of clear legal rules or principles. The 
most notorious example from the world of civil procedure is in personal 
jurisdiction, where the Supreme Court has been unable to articulate a 
single, clear, and binding standard for minimum contacts in specific 
jurisdiction cases.84 While one can easily dwell on such spectacular failures 
of law giving, in other situations the Supreme Court and appellate courts 
have fulfilled their harmonizing and law-giving functions quite nicely.85 
When appellate courts do not perform this law-stating (and even law-
making) function, the process is truncated. The division of labor between 
trial and appellate courts in the American “tiered system” makes the 
appellate courts specialists in formulating and harmonizing legal rules.86 
Although the existence of an appellate tribunal is, itself, not necessary for 
the evolution and formulation of legal rules, its pervasiveness in most areas 
of substantive law has shaped how judges and commentators believe that 
the law can and should be developed.87 The quiet absence (or dampened 
 
82. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 
69 (1985). 
83. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 
235, 252 (1979). 
84. See generally J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (issuing plurality 
opinions regarding specific jurisdiction). 
85. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (resolving a subject matter jurisdiction 
circuit split). 
86. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 
469, 469–70 (1998) (summarizing the law-giving and harmonizing functions of appellate courts). 
87. For example, commentators have suggested and debated the proposition that the structure of 
the common law system produces the most efficient legal rules. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall 
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presence) of the appellate courts in some procedural matters can go 
unnoticed because the issues are merely sheltered and not banished from 
appellate review. In other words, by privileging the law-making function of 
the appellate courts without accounting for the manner in which it is 
sidelined in some procedural rules, commentators have missed an 
opportunity to investigate how the design of rules itself can shape the 
growth and interpretation of legal rules. 
Many scholars who have addressed the intersection of procedural 
decisions and interlocutory review have suggested reforms of the appellate 
process itself. I propose that rulemakers accept that there are areas of law 
with reduced appellate review, and that this fact should influence how rules 
themselves are crafted, namely, that the content and form of the text of the 
rules should be designed to aid in their common law development in the 
absence of appellate review. 
To illustrate both the promise and the problems of appellate review of 
procedural devices, a comparison of the rules for joinder of parties is 
instructive. Rule 19 governs the required joinder of parties, and Rule 20 
governs the permissive joinder of parties. Under the structure of Rule 19, a 
court is required to join a party if it claims an interest in the subject matter 
of the litigation and the court cannot “accord complete relief among 
existing parties” in that party’s absence.88 If joinder is not feasible, 
typically because of problems with subject matter or personal jurisdiction, 
the court must decide whether the action should proceed at all.89 Because 
this structure often results in a final judgment—the total dismissal of some 
lawsuits—Rule 19 cases are appealed more frequently than are Rule 20 
cases. There is, correspondingly, more appellate case law on Rule 19, 
particularly Rule 19(b), than there is concerning the interpretation and 
application of Rule 20. 
One should not rush to the hasty conclusion, however, that more 
appellate law is a panacea for the problems surrounding the interpretation 
and application of procedural rules. Rule 19 is notoriously inscrutable.90 
Thus, the lack of interlocutory review cannot be blamed on its own for 
producing an incoherent body of law for Rule 20. It is one factor of several 
that contributes to the difficulties in governing procedural devices such as 
permissive joinder. The lack of appellate opinions in Rule 20 decisions 
 
of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003) 
(summarizing and contributing to the debate over the efficiency of the common law). Additionally, 
some scholars have pointed to evidence that trial judges have an aversion to reversal by a court of 
appeals. See Drahozal, supra note 86, at 477. 
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(A). 
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b). 
90. See Bone, supra note 41, at 107–14 (criticizing the structure of Rule 19); Richard D. Freer, 
Rethinking Compulsory Joinder: A Proposal to Restructure Federal Rule 19, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1061 
(1985) (describing the problems and competing and conflicting aims of Rule 19). 
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means that the two rules are subject to slightly different problems: Rule 19 
decisions adhere to a recognized standard, but the applications to various 
fact situations remain uncertain. Rule 20 has this problem as well, but 
suffers under the additional burden of unclear and under-harmonized 
statements of the law itself. Thus, one must account for the function of 
appellate review in order to understand its place among other problems 
plaguing procedural rules. This will help to pinpoint and distinguish 
solutions that target the use of facts from solutions that target the absence 
of reliably available law-stating authority. 
Error correction is the other traditional function of appeals courts. 
Generally, in American courts, the error-correction function is limited to 
issues of law, and trial court decisions of fact are rarely reviewed.91 
Although the fact–law distinction is notoriously fuzzy,92 it does constrain 
the error-corrective function of appellate review. One could respond to the 
fact that these procedural rules are not frequent subjects of error correction 
in a few different ways. One is to accept that errors of law will occur with a 
higher degree of frequency in the application of only some procedural 
devices. Another is to increase the availability of appellate review by 
tweaking the interlocutory appeals doctrines. Yet a third response is to 
redefine the mission of a district judge in executing these devices, therefore 
subtly altering the meaning of what “error” might be. When error is 
confined to the process of making a procedural ruling rather than to the 
content of the ruling itself, pressure is taken off of higher courts to perform 
the error-corrective function. 
The structure of appellate jurisdiction either prohibits or substantially 
narrows the ability of appeals courts to adjudicate procedural disputes 
pertaining to a good deal of pretrial decisions by trial judges. This amounts 
to a deprivation of certain types of information. It means that litigants, 
judges, and rulemakers are deprived of the law-stating information that 
appellate courts would ordinarily supply. It also means that there is a lack 
of information concerning when and how often lower courts err in their 
application of procedural rules. Once the problem of appellate review is 
cast as an informational problem rather than a structural appellate 
problem, the possibility of reformulated rules becomes more attractive. 
Taking these two broad problems together, the procedural devices best 
suited for reason-giving rules have key attributes in common. First, these 
devices are those that are used for the purposes of managing and regulating 
litigation. Second, these devices are those about which a trial judge has 
special knowledge and expertise, much like an agency administrator. Third, 
 
91. See McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954) (reviewing findings of fact from a 
district court bench trial using a “clear error” standard). 
92. See Effron, supra note 7, at 774. 
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using an outcome-based standard has not produced an acceptable balance 
of judicial flexibility and rule uniformity. Fourth, in some situations, 
insulation from appellate review further contributes to the clarification and 
common law development of the device’s rule. 
II. PROCEDURAL LAW AND THE PUZZLE OF REASON GIVING 
This Article proposes using reason giving, a tool of administrative law, 
as a solution to a judicial problem. This Part addresses a few background 
hurdles. First, it examines the validity of turning to administrative law by 
establishing the shared space between the management of a lawsuit and the 
administrative functions of an agency or administrator. It then turns to the 
concept of reason giving. Writ large, reason giving is a value and project 
that extends far beyond administrative law. In fact, insofar as much of the 
visible output of the judiciary comes in the form of written, justificatory 
opinions, it might already seem that reason giving is a central function of 
the trial judge. This Part distinguishes the general project of giving reasons 
from its more specific applications in administrative law in order to 
demonstrate what these reason-giving rules might add to civil procedure. 
A. The Connection Between Administrative Law, Procedure, and 
Delegated Discretion 
Procedural law regulates several different types of actors in the dispute 
resolution system. Lawyers are obvious targets, as well as private persons, 
both as litigants and third parties.93 Commentators have thoroughly 
explored the topic of lawyers and private persons as subjects of procedural 
regulation, and, indeed, the regulation of the behavior of lawyers, litigants, 
and other persons and entities involved in judicial proceedings is one of the 
most important functions of procedure. But procedural rules also regulate 
the behavior of judges because they too are actors in the dispute resolution 
system.94 Procedural rules govern judicial behavior by supplying the 
standards, either mandatory or permissive, for managing litigation. Judges 
are regulators and administrators of procedure. By the most formal 
definition, the few judges who serve as members of the Rules Advisory 
Committee are rulemakers in the traditional sense of drafting and 
implementing rules. However, even judges who are not involved in that 
 
93. See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
507, 540 (2011) (“[E]very public procedural rule[] effectively regulates three distinct relations: that of 
government to disputant, that of the disputants inter se, and that of the disputants to strangers.”). 
94. I have used the term “judicial behavior” rather than “judicial conduct” since the latter often 
refers to the professional and ethical rules governing judges. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
(2011). 
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process are the day-to-day regulators of procedure,95 the administrators of 
delegated authority. 
Over the past few decades, several prominent scholars have argued that 
trial judges, in their managerial capacities, have taken on a second mantle 
as administrators.96 Managerial judging has made trial judges the primary 
administrators of procedural law. Judges participate in the process of rule 
making; they are one of the primary subjects of that regulation97 and are 
also a major consumer of the regulatory work of procedure. Accounting for 
these roles can aid in the design of the procedural devices closely 
associated with the phenomenon of managerial judging. 
Particularly when managing complex litigation, the day-to-day work of 
a trial judge resembles that of a modern high-level administrator as much 
as it does the classical model of a robed figure presiding over a trial and 
writing opinions.98 These observations have led commentators to suggest 
that some of the tools of administrative law would be helpful in 
ameliorating some of the pressures that the administration of modern 
litigation can place on judicial responsibilities.99 For example, the 
observation that mass litigation operates in parallel to public administration 
 
95. See Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 651 (2011) (“Taken together, the various pretrial doctrines amount to the 
construction of a distinctively judicial mode for the regulation of variance and cost imposition in civil 
litigation.”). 
96. See Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons for 
Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 595 (2011) (Class actions 
“resemble administrative regulation.”); Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of 
Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 338 (Class actions are a “centralizing device designed to 
accomplish some of the same functions as performed by the state.”); Richard A. Nagareda, Turning 
from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 902 (1996) (“[T]he rise of [mass] settlements in tort 
mirrors the development of public administrative agencies earlier in this century.”); Judith Resnik, 
From “Cases” to “Litigation,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 5; see also Howard M. 
Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and 
Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (“[C]lass actions . . . share an 
essential attribute of government actions.”). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort 
Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 431 (1999) 
(“[T]he mass tort paradigm resembles more closely private legislation implemented through private 
administrative means.”). 
97. Judges are not the only subjects of regulation. Rule 11 illustrates nicely how a procedural rule 
can regulate the behavior of multiple actors. Rule 11 regulates the conduct of lawyers, requiring that the 
lawyer sign and certify written motions, pleadings, and other paper; dictates the mechanics of the 
signature; and tells lawyers how to file a motion for sanctions under the rule. Rule 11 also contains 
instructions directed at the judge, permitting a judge to levy sanctions at her own initiative, and 
providing the standard by which sanctions are calculated. Rule 11 also regulates the behavior of parties, 
by extending the duties of Rule 11(b) to parties who violate or are “responsible for the violation” of that 
rule. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
98. See Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for A New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 39–
42 (2003) (contrasting the traditional judicial role with modern managerial judging); Resnik, supra note 
39, at 376–77 (describing managerial judging). 
99. See, e.g., Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil 
Procedure: Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012). 
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has led some scholars to consider administrative law solutions to the 
problems of complex litigation because administrative law has, to a large 
degree, addressed issues of legitimacy and competence.100 Commentators 
have met these solutions with debate and some tentative approval.101 Some 
of these responses suggest methods for accommodating and improving the 
occurrences of managerial judging; others reject these administrative 
practices as judicial overreaching or as inappropriately delegating authority 
to the lawyers and third parties involved in processing complex litigation. 
In any case, few commentators deny that the phenomenon of managerial 
judging has become entrenched in modern judicial practice and is 
facilitated by procedural rules, particularly those that govern pretrial 
practice. 
The analogies are not confined to the world of complex litigation. 
Scholars have also examined the rulemaking process itself and its 
relationship to principles of administrative law. Noting the uneasy position 
that the FRCP occupies between the legislative and judicial branches,102 
commentators have called for the application of administrative law 
principles to the promulgation, passage, and interpretation of the FRCP.103 
This scholarship often focuses on the Supreme Court as the locus of rule 
making and the target of reform. For example, Professors Mulligan and 
 
100. Scholars have proposed several such solutions: structuring judicial settlement review in the 
manner currently utilized by agencies during the rulemaking process, Molot, supra note 98, at 51–58; 
Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 512 (2011) (“[M]any scholars have 
observed that class action settlement funds often resemble ‘private’ or ‘miniature’ administrative 
agencies.”), providing for wider participation rights similar to those in formal rule-making, Nagareda, 
supra note 96, at 950–52, calculating attorneys’ fees, Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 377, 408 (2011), fairness hearings for class actions, William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness 
Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1477–79 (2006) (arguing 
for a class action investigatory agency at the settlement stage), and supervision of class counsel, 
RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 236–268 (2007); John Fabian 
Witt, Bureaucratic Legalism, American Style: Private Bureaucratic Legalism and the Governance of 
the Tort System, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 261 (2007). 
101. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Governing Securities Class Actions, 80 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 299, 305–07 (2011) (“The public law analogy to political governance holds the most promise for 
addressing both the principal-agent and the class member-lead plaintiff relationship.”); Martha Minow, 
Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2010 (1997) (offering a cautious endorsement of Judge Weinstein’s managerial 
methods). But see Linda S. Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 
NW. U. L. REV. 579, 589 (1994) (describing managerial judging as the “disturbing trend of mass tort 
judges to usurp authority over the conduct of such cases, frequently in the name of judicial efficiency 
and economy”). 
102. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic 
Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 888–89 (1999) (summarizing critiques of the 
rulemaking process); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on 
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 599–600 (2010) (describing the various bodies involved in the 
rulemaking process). 
103. See, e.g., Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1141–69 (2002) (arguing “for an interpretive approach [to 
the FRCP] that proceeds from an awareness of the scope of the Enabling Act delegation”). 
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Staszewski recently have suggested that policy changes in rules of civil 
procedure should be made through rule making rather than through 
adjudication.104  Here, I suggest taking the argument one step further to 
extend some of the principles of administrative law to trial court judges.  
To the extent that Congress (via the rules drafters) has delegated discretion 
to judges for certain regulatory choices and outcomes, it may be 
appropriate to turn to administrative law for lessons in how to constrain and 
manage delegated discretion vis à vis district judges105 insofar as their 
practices and decisions have become part of a “bottom-up” method of 
procedural regulation.106 
Most procedural rules adhere to a model that is more or less analogous 
to the style of regulation known in administrative/regulatory law circles as 
“command and control.” The rules come in the form of “do this” or “don’t 
do that.” Compliance with a rule is measured by adherence to its rules. For 
many procedural rules and devices, command and control works quite well. 
If rulemakers want parties to serve a summons that states the name of the 
court and the parties, then it will draft a rule mandating that a summons 
must “name the court and the parties.”107  If the rulemakers want to specify 
a range of permissible behaviors, these too can flow from the dictates of a 
directive.108 
Procedural regulation is not limited to a purely didactic approach. 
Regulators can elicit desired results by constructing a system of incentives 
to encourage the subjects of regulation to engage in desired conduct. If 
rulemakers want to enable cost-effective and efficient notice procedures, 
they can encourage certain parties to waive formal service of process by 
imposing the costs of service on a party who chooses against waiver.109 
Just as rulemakers can regulate through methods such as command and 
control and through other incentives, so can they regulate through 
processes aimed at delivering good outcomes, rather than dictating the 
outcomes themselves ex ante. It is a practice that already occurs at a 
 
104. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 99, at 1191–92. 
105. See Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011) (applying administrative law principles to the Supreme Court certiorari 
process). Professor Watts explores the possibility of applying the non-delegation doctrine itself to 
certiorari doctrine. I do not believe that the strictures of the non-delegation doctrine itself are implicated 
in most of the rules and devices that I discuss, mainly because the rules themselves do not seem to be an 
impermissible delegation of authority. I borrow, however, her emphasis on regulatory solutions to the 
problems of delegated authority. 
106. See Mark Moller, Procedural Siloing, PRAWFS BLAWG (Aug. 21, 2012, 10:35 PM), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/08/procedural-siloing.html (“Procedural law is 
bottom-up law. It tends to develop at the trial court level, not the Supreme Court level.”). 
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(a)(1)(A). 
108. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e) (specifying several alternative methods for serving individuals 
within a judicial district of the United States). 
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2). 
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minimal level in procedural regulation, and my proposal here is to 
recognize and amplify its place as a regulatory tool.  
B. Reason Giving and Its Uses as a Regulatory Tool 
I have suggested that certain aspects of judicial trial management 
closely resemble the tasks of an administrator and that, therefore, the 
operation of certain procedural devices might best be regulated as if they 
were in the domain of administrative law. The administrative law tool that I 
suggest is reason giving, yet one might argue that the project of writing 
justificatory decisions is already central to the judicial role. This section 
investigates the phenomenon of reason giving as a general matter, and its 
role as a regulatory tool in particular. 
The project of administrative law is instructive because “explicit 
reason-giving [is] a major part of the industry of the administrative state”110 
and could have applications beyond the agency context.111 The principle 
has shaped the practice of administrative decisionmaking since its 
inception, and “the Supreme Court has extended the demand for explicit 
reason-giving to virtually every form of agency action and every 
conceivable type of deficiency in an agency’s stated justification for its 
action.”112 
Administrative law deals largely with the problem of delegated 
authority. Legislatures delegate decisionmaking and rulemaking authority 
to administrative agencies because agencies possess the resources and 
expertise to engage in the particularized and context-specific activity of 
generating, interpreting, and applying rules. Delegated authority, however, 
comes at the cost of a loss of democratic accountability and the concern 
that agency decisions are founded on incorrect or incomplete findings of 
fact, on arbitrary or impermissible reasoning, or are otherwise unsound. 
Administrative law contains a web of doctrines to accommodate the 
benefits of delegated authority while managing its difficulties. One key 
feature of this system is the reason-giving requirement for agency 
decisionmaking. 
The reason-giving requirements in administrative law stem from 
explicit statutory requirements and case law development. The 
 
110. Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 957 
(2007); see also Short, supra note 8, at 1813 (“Reason giving is central to U.S. administrative law and 
practice.”). 
111. Stack, supra note 110, at 1013–20 (suggesting that certain actions of the President taken 
under powers granted by Congress are subject to the Chenery reason-giving requirements). 
112. Id. at 962; see also Short, supra note 8, at 1815 (explaining that the APA’s “arbitrary and 
capricious” standard for agency rulemaking “demand[s] rational reasons and evidence developed by an 
agency”). 
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself requires a statement of reasons 
to accompany certain types of decisions.113 The Supreme Court has added 
to the reason-giving requirement by specifying in the Chenery114 decision 
that “agency actions will stand or fall based on the reasons that the agency 
itself provides, even if other reasons could be found to support those 
actions.”115 The Court further defined reason giving in the context of 
arbitrary and capricious review of informal agency action in the Overton 
Park116 and State Farm117 cases. This line of cases established “hard look” 
review, which requires more than simply a statement of reasons and 
demands that an agency consider and document evidence and competing 
policy alternatives.118 The growth and development of the hard look 
doctrine has been tied to courts’ conception of how much authority has 
been delegated to administrative agencies and how best to manage that 
discretion.119 The scope of administrative reason giving and the permissible 
range of influences and evidence for those decisions has been the subject of 
intense academic debate in administrative law circles. The important point 
here is to expose the foundations of administrative law reason giving that 
make it unique—namely, that the validity of a decision is measured by the 
nature and quality of the reasons given by the decisionmaker, rather than by 
reasons or arguments that could be supplied post hoc by a reviewing 
tribunal.120 
There is an intuitive appeal to reason giving, and discussions of the 
virtues of giving reasons has a long and rich intellectual history that 
engages any number of public and private actors: the philosopher, the 
legislator, the judge, the administrator, and the citizen-observer. When a 
decisionmaker delivers a reasoned justification for a decision, it signals that 
the grounds for decision are public and could be verified or replicated by an 
external source. A reasoned decision is harder to characterize as the 
product of a decisionmaker’s whim or fancy. 
The benefits of reason giving inure to different parties. Reason giving 
benefits the parties to a dispute when the decisionmaker has listened to or 
 
113. Administrative Procedure Act § 8(b), 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A) (2006). 
114. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
115. Short, supra note 8, at 1818. 
116. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated by Califano v. 
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 
117. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983). 
118. See Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505 (1985); 
Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 
5–6 (2009) (describing the evolution and standards of hard look review). 
119. Garland, supra note 118, at 520–525. 
120. See David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in 
COMMON LAW THEORY 134, 143–146 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007) (discussing the reason-giving duties 
of judges and administrative agencies in other common law countries). 
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accounted for the positions of the interested parties and then based the 
decision on rational and publicly accessible grounds.121 Third parties and 
the public at large benefit from the information generated by the decision 
and also from the assurance that decisionmaking processes are fair such 
that the process for reaching a decision is relatively predictable, even if the 
outcome of every decision is not. The decisionmakers themselves benefit 
from reason giving insofar as it clarifies one’s own thinking and illuminates 
facts or conclusions that might need additional support.122 
These are appealing thoughts: who wouldn’t prefer a transparent 
statement of reasons for every decision? The development of the common 
law itself seems to place justificatory decisions at its core: the content of 
the law itself springs from a series of decisions about specific disputes that 
are resolved with reference to public and generalizable reasons.123 The 
practical reality, however, is that many decisions made by judges, as well 
as decisions from other decisionmakers, are issue without a statement of 
reasons.124 Portrayals of the judicial role as a center of reason giving tend to 
focus on the central and dispositive decisions that judges make. Judges, 
however, must make many decisions, not all of which can or should be 
supported by publicly reasoned and written opinions.125 Moreover, in most 
instances, judges are not required to give reasons for their decisions.126 
That is to say, a judicial decision may stand if the ruling is correct, even if 
the reasoning is wrong.127 
Administrative law is one realm where the project of giving reasons 
moves from a virtuous (and perhaps aspirational) practice, to a regulatory 
tool. Reason-giving requirements in administrative law address specific 
problems with the administrative state, namely, the need for transparency, 
democratic accountability, and the regulation of delegated discretion. 
Reason giving is thought to ensure a certain level of quality and uniformity 
in the decisionmaking process because decisions are made by diffuse 
 
121. See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the Nature of the Judicial 
Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283 (2008). 
122. Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 180. This 
may or may not be true of written reasons, a question to which I return in Part III.B.2. 
123. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 641 (1995). 
124. See id. at 637. 
125. Id. 
126. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 379 (2012) (“Neither 
constitutional review of federal legislation nor the standards of appellate review of lower court 
decisions impose this demanding uphold-only-for-the-reasons-given rule.”). 
127. See Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 472 (1981) (failure to give reasons in 
criminal case not reversible error); Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 333 n.147 (1982) (“A case frequently cited to support broad statements that due 
process does not require judges to give reasons for their decisions is Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 
497 (1978).”). But see FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006) (requiring judges to disclose 
reasons when sentencing some criminal defendants illustrate a few exceptions to this general rule). 
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administrators on vastly different subjects. They assure the public and 
interested parties that, not only are the decisions rational and transparent, 
but that the process and outcome are available to the public in a predictable 
and uniform manner.  Many of these problems and motivations map nicely 
onto the realm of managerial judging, and it is to this area that I now turn. 
Thus, despite the fact that judges do not, as a matter of law or practice, 
engage in formal reason giving, their role in the common law system as the 
writers of justificatory opinions makes them well suited for using reason-
giving rules. 
III. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RULE DESIGN 
In the abstract, making the case for the project of a reason-giving 
requirement is fairly straightforward. Insofar as “[a] decision-maker 
required to give reasons will be more likely to weigh pros and cons 
carefully before reaching a decision than will a decision-maker able to 
proceed by simple fiat,”128 it hardly seems controversial to suggest that 
judges justify their decisions with meaningful reasons. The challenge in 
designing an effective reason-giving requirement lies in specifying how 
judges should engage in a project of reason giving that improves upon the 
existing norm of justificatory opinion writing and in choosing the form of 
reason giving so that it is effective without becoming inefficient or 
onerous.129 
A. Sketching the Contours of a Reason-Giving Requirement 
Part I of this Article showed the deficits in current formulations of 
some procedural rules, particularly some of the rules of joinder. That 
analysis, however, also forms the basis for the strength of a reason-giving 
approach. Rulemakers should deploy the tools of reason giving to regulate 
devices that have such deficits. In determining the “how” of reason giving, 
rulemakers would need to decide what sorts of reasons judges ought to be 
giving, and how a rule would best promote this project. This Article 
proposes that reason-giving rules for procedure take the following form: (1) 
The rule should make an explicit grant of discretion to the trial court; and 
(2) the rule should contain an explicit list of policies that the trial court 
must use to give reasons on the record for its decision. This style of rule 
closely resembles the Chenery model from administrative law in which 
 
128. Shapiro, supra note 122, at 180. 
129. Discussion of the form that reason-giving rules should take is deferred to Part III.C. 
EFFRON 683-733 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2014  1:32 PM 
716 Alabama Law Review [Vol. 65:3:683 
(nearly) any outcome of an agency rule or decision is permissible, so long 
as the decisionmaker has supplied adequate reasons for decision.130 
The explicit grant of discretion serves a few important functions. First, 
it clarifies the nature of the discretion that a judge exercises in these aspects 
of managing litigation. As currently drafted and applied, some rules convey 
an ambiguous or mixed message about the type of discretion they may (or 
may not) grant.131  To the extent that the rules are drafted as standards that 
are subject to a healthy dose of interpretive discretion, the present range of 
interpretations and applications resemble the unchecked or chaotic power 
by the judge. And to the extent that the rules are meant to convey a certain 
degree of managerial flexibility, the formulations of the standards do not 
suggest meaningful criteria or boundaries within which a judge should 
exercise discretion. 
Moreover, if a rule explicitly grants discretion to the trial judge, it 
signals that a certain type of reason giving is in order. Such a grant would 
indicate that the judge has the expertise and knowledge to come to a 
conclusion that cannot be anticipated in detail ex ante by the rulemakers, 
and that there is a range of permissible reasons that a judge may examine 
and apply in order to justify her decision. An explicit grant of discretion 
would be admission by the rulemakers that, not only can they not anticipate 
all possible factual scenarios in advance, but that a vague standard that has 
a façade of uniformity132 covering an implicit grant of interpretive 
discretion does not convey meaningful information about the content of a 
directive. An explicit grant of discretion would reinforce the idea that the 
procedural device is being regulated both by the content of the rule and by 
the way the judge applies it to a given situation. In other words, the 
regulation is found as much in the reasoning as it is in the content of the 
standard. 
Having made a grant of discretion explicit, the rule must also 
communicate the contours of the reasons to be given. The FRCP as 
currently crafted manifest an “avoidance of prospective policy choices.”133 
This need not always be the case. Rulemakers could do a more 
comprehensive job ex ante of defining the purposes and goals of procedural 
devices, incorporating these standards or factors into the rules, and 
specifying how judges should consider each factor. 
Procedural rules vary in how explicitly the rulemakers have stated the 
purposes of a procedural device, the policy choices embodied, or how a 
 
130. See Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 93–95 (1943). 
131. Short, supra note 8, at 1815. 
132. As Professor Burbank has observed, “[r]ules that avoid policy choices and that in essence 
chart ad hoc decision-making by trial judges are uniform . . . in only the most trivial sense.” Burbank, 
supra note 24, at 715. 
133. Id. 
EFFRON 683-733 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2014  1:32 PM 
2014] Reason Giving and Rule Making 717 
judge should resolve a conflict between the multiple values or goals 
encompassed by a single procedural device. Consider the example of Rule 
15(c), which states that “amendment to a pleading relates back to the date 
of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense 
that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or 
attempted to be set out—in the original pleading . . . .” As I have argued 
above and in my previous work, the rationale behind the relation-back 
doctrine does not appear in the text of the directive. More importantly, it 
does not convey the policies and values behind relation back, nor is it clear 
that the rulemakers themselves have even made any such definitive policy 
decisions. The rule does not dictate what policies or factors a court should 
consider; however, judges have approached the rule like many other rules 
or statutes and supplied the rationales by looking to prior interpretations of 
the rule and appealing to common sense equitable arguments regarding the 
fairness of permitting a party to amend its pleading. Even so, the policies 
behind relation-back doctrine decisions interpreting and applying 15(c) 
have produced a confusing landscape of conflicting decisions.134 
A relation-back rule that promotes reason giving would grant discretion 
to the judge to permit amendment of a pleading so long as the court has 
considered, and perhaps weighed, certain factors. One of the policies 
behind the relation-back doctrine is that it should only be applied when the 
adverse party has adequate notice of the amended claims.135 The “conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence” standard is supposed to further this policy by 
ensuring that only “related” claims can be added if time-barred, the 
relatedness serving as a proxy for notice.136 If the claim is sufficiently 
related, so the logic goes, then the adverse party is charged with notice that 
additional claims might be asserted against him. The problem with using 
“notice” as the touchstone policy behind the interpretation of “conduct, 
transaction, or occurrence” is that it adds little or nothing of value to the 
relatedness standard in the directive. It also smacks of circularity: a party 
must have had notice if the claims were related, and relatedness is defined 
by notice. In other words, just adding more descriptive policy language to 
the text of a rule does not necessarily ensure that the rule will become 
clearer, or that judges would engage in targeted policy-oriented reason 
giving.137 
A better approach would be to look behind the notice concept, find 
distinct policies, and bring them forward as part of the standard. In my 
 
134. See Effron, supra note 7, at 785–89. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. The “notice” standard for Rule 15(c) is standard across all circuits, but has not resulted in 
uniformity or predictability in 15(c) decisions. See id. at 783–89. 
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previous work, I showed how judges engage in a practice of 
“redescription” to utilize the categories of fact and law to shore up claims 
they believe to be related or break apart claims they believe to be 
inappropriate candidates for joinder, even if they appear nominally related. 
In the context of Rule 15(c) decisions, this practice is more than an 
example of judges applying a malleable standard in a haphazard fashion. 
Rather, it shows that judges are struggling with a number of underlying and 
sometimes conflicting policies, namely: (1) whether it is fair or efficient to 
allow a party to change her legal theory when it is based on the same 
factual scenario as the original complaint; (2) whether it is fair or efficient 
to allow a party to describe a factual scenario in general terms, and then 
add claims that depend on more specific facts that fall within the original 
factual scenario but have not been included in the original complaint; (3) 
whether it is fair or efficient to allow a party to define a factual scenario by 
reference to the type of claim asserted, for example, by adding additional 
instances of discriminatory conduct to a complaint that initially pled a 
discrete or narrowly defined instance of discrimination.138 
Each of those factors represents the genuine policy interests that are at 
stake when a judge is deciding whether to permit the amendment of a 
complaint to include a time-barred element. Some of these concerns 
involve notice, but others appear to be related to more general concerns 
about the fairness or efficiency of adding additional claims or defenses well 
into the litigation process.139 The current standard does not explicitly 
condone an honest examination of these factors, how they might conflict, 
and how one policy might be more compelling in some cases than others. 
Instead, judges are left to use shadow tools such as redescription in order to 
appeal to these policy goals. The decisions then lack a common metric and 
appear to form an inconsistent and frustratingly opaque area of law. 
Suppose that Rule 15(c) were written with the promotion of reason 
giving in mind. Following the model of explicit discretion coupled with 
factors for consideration, the rule might read as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138. For a longer explication of each of these policies, see id. 
139. This concern is somewhat in conflict with the otherwise liberal policy of Rule 15 to allow 
amendments of complaints where the claims are not time-barred. See FED R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2) (Judges 
should “freely give leave” to amend a complaint “when justice so requires.”). 
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Current Rule 15(c) Sample Rule 15(c) 
RELATION BACK OF 
AMENDMENTS. 
(1) When an Amendment Relates 
Back. An amendment to a pleading 
relates back to the date of the 
original pleading when:  
. . . 
(B) the amendment asserts a claim 
or defense that arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or 
occurrence set out—or attempted 
to be set out—in the original 
pleading . . . . 
RELATION BACK OF 
AMENDMENTS. 
(1)  An amendment to a pleading 
relates back to the date of the 
original pleading when: 
(A) the amendment asserts a 
claim or defense that is related to 
the claims or defenses set out—
or attempted to be set out—in the 
original pleading. The court may 
find that a claim or defense 
relates back after considering: 
(i) Whether the addition of a 
novel legal theory would cause 
undue delay or hardship to the 
adverse party; 
(ii) Whether the pleading 
contains new facts, the 
investigation and litigation of 
which would cause undue 
delay or hardship to the 
adverse party; 
(iii) Whether the factual 
scenario, liberally construed, 
allows the party to assert 
additional claims on similar 
legal theories. 
 
The purpose of such a rule would not be to force a judge to decide 
between the policies, or even to specify that one is more important than the 
others. Rather, it acknowledges that each of these factors may be more or 
less salient in any given case and that the trial judge has the expertise to 
make the determination, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of 
policy.140 
To be clear, a rule that simply provides a list of factors does not 
necessarily function as a reason-giving rule. Take, for example, Rule 23. 
Rule 23 is long. It contains significant detail regarding how class actions 
should be certified, maintained, settled, appealed, and how notice must be 
 
140. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for 
Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (“In filling those gaps with case-specific interpretive 
responses, federal courts perform an important policymaking function.”). 
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given to class members. Rule 23(a) famously gives a list of factors that a 
judge must consider as prerequisites to certifying a class: numerosity, 
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.141 
Just because this is a list of factors, however, does not mean that the list 
is useful, particularly as a reason-giving exercise. Each of those four factors 
is very broad (if not vague), and the meaning of each is hotly contested. 
Indeed, some judges and scholars question whether some of the factors 
such as typicality and adequacy are even distinct.142 A reason-giving 
element would specify, within each of these categories, further factors that 
a judge should consider. For example, the factor of numerosity might state 
that a judge should consider explicitly why or how joinder is impracticable. 
The typicality and adequacy factors might require a judge to consider a set 
number of different arrangements of lead plaintiff and counsel in order to 
articulate and conclude why the chosen parties fulfill one or both of these 
factors. 
Other rules in the FRCP come closer to filling in some of these details. 
For example, the rule for permissive intervention in federal courts, Rule 
24(b) states that “[o]n timely motion, the court may permit anyone to 
intervene who . . . has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a 
common question of law or fact.”143 Like the “transaction or occurrence” 
standard, the fairly generic “common question of law or fact” standard does 
not give any further direction as to the application of the rule or the policies 
that judges should be fulfilling when permitting an intervenor. Is a 
“common question of law or fact” the same standard, policy, and concerns 
that a judge should consider when interpreting and applying Rules 20, 23, 
and 42? A survey of decisions shows that judges will sometimes, but not 
always, consider the policies and goals of other joinder devices using the 
same language in interpreting the phrase.144 Thus, the reasons articulated 
for one application of the rule may not be comparable to or consistent with 
other uses of the phrase. 
Rule 24(b) does, however, contain some additional elements that move 
it toward a reason-giving model. Rule 24(b)(3) directs that the judge, in 
exercising her discretion, should consider “whether the intervention will 
 
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
142. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 n.5 (2011) (“[T]he commonality 
and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) tend to merge.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating Class 
Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1060 (2005) (stating that the Supreme Court has “collapse[d] the 
commonality, typicality, adequacy, and predominance inquiries”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis 
and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 62 (1991) (“There is some conceptual and 
factual overlap between the typicality and adequacy requirements.”). 
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(1). 
144. See Effron, supra note 7. 
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unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.”145 
In combination with 24(b)(1)’s requirement that the motion be “timely,” 
this rule could be effective in promoting reason giving. This might in fact 
be true—in my original study of joinder rules, I did not find the same 
complications in the interpretation and application of Rule 24(b)(1)’s 
“common question” as I did in other rules such as Rule 20. Rule 24(b), 
however, suffers from another and rather curious problem: its proximity to 
Rule 24(a). Rule 24(a) governs intervention as of right, and as a practical 
matter, parties seeking to intervene in an action will seek to intervene under 
Rule 24(a) and use Rule 24(b) as a backup or alternative basis for 
intervention. Typically, a court considering such motions will make a 
detailed analysis of the standard in Rule 24(a) and then grant or deny the 
Rule 24(b) motion for “similar reasons” that the court has already recited 
for the 24(a) motion.146 
Given the frequency of this practice, one would assume that the 
standards, factors, and policies of the two rules are fairly similar. In fact, 
the “interests” analysis of Rule 24(a)(2) is quite different from the 
relatedness analysis that 24(b)(1) purports to demand. Rule 24, then, 
illustrates another facet of the difficulty in designing rules to promote 
reason giving: the fact that the availability of alternative procedural devices 
can affect how parties frame an issue and how judges relay decisions. A 
rule for a device like permissive intervention might need special language 
to alert judges to the fact that separate reasoning is needed from that of 
intervention as of right. 
A keen focus on a well-designed list of factors encourages the 
production of useful information.147 Many of the procedural devices 
associated with managerial judging are intertwined with thorny questions 
of litigation costs. A reason-giving process that encourages judges to both 
consider and disclose the actual or projected costs to the parties and to the 
court of the use of a procedural device would be a useful tool in 
illuminating the shadowy areas of procedural costs. Judges, lawyers, and 
commentators often invoke the high costs of some pretrial devices to the 
parties and the court. The exact costs, however, are little known. Judges are 
not operating in a black box when making such cost calculations. Indeed, 
their special knowledge and expertise of the realities of how devices are 
used and how much they cost is precisely the reason that rulemakers can or 
do delegate authority to trial judges to make such decisions. What is 
 
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b)(3). 
146. Analysis of Rule 24 decisions collected from Westlaw on file with the author. 
147. See Davis & Hershkoff, supra note 93, at 541 (“[A]djudication is an important source of 
information, the classic public good. In the course of adjudicating a dispute, a court generates 
information about (1) the dispute and (2) the process of adjudication. The procedural rules employed by 
the court influence the production and dissemination of both kinds of information.”). 
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missing, however, are basic facts about the costs of such devices across 
parties, districts, or types of cases, so that judges could ensure that 
decisions regarding costs are made according to a determinable and 
articulable baseline. The disclosure of the factual information behind the 
organized reasoning of courts could form the beginning of such a dialogue 
and inquiry. 
Not every procedural device is an appropriate candidate for a rule that 
couples an explicit delegation of discretion with a reason-giving element. 
In addition to narrowing the group of suitable devices to those closely 
associated with the managerial tasks of judging,148 one must consider 
carefully whether certain devices should be subject to the exercise of 
judicial discretion. One such device, for example, is the compulsory 
counterclaim. Although the compulsory counterclaim is a joinder device 
that implicates emblematic managerial concerns about packaging and 
organizing a lawsuit, its function is primarily to assist courts in determining 
whether a future claim may be barred or whether a present claim makes 
possible federal subject matter jurisdiction.149 
“Claim-determinative” devices like compulsory counterclaims do not 
manifest as strong of a tension between regulation and discretion because 
the values of predictability and of starkly delineating federal authority are 
particularly high. A rule of compulsory counterclaims that hinges on an 
explicit grant of discretion seems a contradiction in terms, and would not 
signal to litigants the sort of finality and predictability that such a 
procedural device is meant to convey. Compelling as these concerns might 
be, Rule 13(a) at present can already be characterized as a discretionary 
standard cloaked in the form of a mandatory rule.150 Despite this 
observation, I believe that with a device such as the compulsory 
counterclaim, it is wiser to continue to strive toward better accuracy and 
precision in the standard itself, rather than turning to the second-best 
solution of explicitly delegated discretion and promotion of reason giving. 
B. Requiring Reasons? 
Should judges be required to give reasons? If so, must these reasons be 
in writing? These questions encompass the functions of judicial 
decisionmaking far beyond the narrow slice of procedural law with which 
this Article is concerned.151 To the extent that I am advocating an 
 
148. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
150. See id. 
151. See Oldfather, supra note 121, at 1318–20; see also SCHAUER, supra note 123, at 140–42; 
Micah Schwartzman, Essay, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1002–05 (2008). 
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administrative law approach for the rules covering select procedural 
devices, I must also explain why reason giving should be required, as 
opposed to merely suggested or encouraged, and how such a requirement 
might be enforced. 
1. A Preliminary Argument for a Mandatory Rule 
Reason-giving rules could take two forms. One would require reason 
giving. The other would merely promote or encourage reason giving. 
Chenery-style rules and the APA take the requirement path. But before 
automatically assigning that requirement to judges, one must consider 
whether a rule can or should make this requirement and whether the 
requirement is preferable to the alternative. 
The reason-giving requirement in administrative law stems from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Chenery, which held that an administrative 
agency’s actions may only be upheld when the agency has provided valid 
reasons for its decision.152 Congress delegates discretion to an 
administrative agency to maximize an agency’s flexibility to exercise its 
special knowledge. A similar delegation of discretion to judges—persons 
with special expertise in administering litigation—can be seen in some 
procedural rules. As Professor Watts has noted of the Supreme Court, 
“Congress’s willingness to give the Court broad discretion can be 
explained largely by functional concerns relating to expertise and 
flexibility.”153 Thus, the reason-giving requirement of administrative law is 
an apt analogy to the procedural context when the judge is cast as an 
administrator of dispute resolution. 
When a procedural rule is the product of the tension between regulation 
and discretion, it does not wear its rationale on its face. When rulemakers 
do not state or even agree upon policies and reasons for a device and its 
associated directive,154 this task either falls to the judges applying the rules 
or results in chaotic doctrine. Similarly, when trial court decisions are 
insulated from appellate review, the result can be both a lack of reason 
giving, or a lack of an organized reason-giving framework that might have 
resulted from regular appellate review of such decisions. 
To suggest that some procedural rules should incorporate a reason-
giving element is not to say that judges currently operate in a chaotic, 
unbounded, completely arbitrary, or totally opaque universe. Judges are 
keenly aware of the need to provide public and serious explications of their 
 
152. Chenery I, 318 U.S. 80, 93–94 (1943). 
153. Watts, supra note 105, at 24. 
154. The official Advisory Committee Comments to the FRCP sometimes fill this function. 
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decisions, both out of an internal sense of the public interest,155 a constraint 
against arbitrary decisionmaking,156 and out of an understanding that the 
parties as well as the larger audience of the legal community demand 
explanations,157 whether they come in the form of lengthy opinions, short 
written memoranda, or short verbal statements on the record. However, 
“[s]ometimes, federal courts fail to explain procedural decisions” because 
“it is often difficult to specify the conditions for many routine managerial 
decisions, even those with significance for the parties.”158 This argument 
should not be taken as a criticism of judges for ruling without articulated or 
articulable reasons. Rather, it is a suggestion that the current structure of 
some procedural rules does not fully harness the power of directed and 
organized reason giving as a tool for the development of procedural 
regulation. 
The difficulty of moving from extreme factual particularity to more 
general reason giving has stymied the ability of courts to create a workable 
body of applicable rules or joinder devices. But it would be unfair to lay the 
blame at the feet of judges, as if they are unwilling or incapable of giving 
reasons. Rather, the fault lies in rules that have been designed to block 
rather than foster reason giving. 
The Supreme Court has formulated the reason-giving requirement as 
one that establishes a “rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.”159 The problem with some of the procedural decisions 
identified in Part I is not that they lack reasons, but that the reasons are 
often a recitation of facts followed by a recitation of the legal standard.160 
Such recitations, even if detailed and thoughtful, do not necessarily mean 
that a judge has engaged in reason giving. Professor Schauer, in his 
exploration of reason giving, has argued that extreme specificity and 
 
155. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 14 (1993) (discussing the judicial sense of public 
interest); see also Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1285 
(2009) (“Social scientists and philosophers have recognized that reason-giving is an innate 
characteristic of human beings that is associated with our ability to rationally evaluate and justify our 
actions.”). 
156. See Maltz, supra note 79, at 1400–02; Schauer, supra note 123. 
157. See Tracey E. George et al., The New Old Legal Realism, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 689, 690–91 
(2011) (“[J]udicial opinions . . . tell consumers of law what they should expect courts to do in the 
future.”); Maltz, supra note 79, at 1397 (describing arguments for the legitimating function of Supreme 
Court opinions). 
158. Mark Moller, Procedure’s Ambiguity, 86 IND. L.J. 645, 651 (2011). 
159. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). 
160. See Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1394–95 (1995) (“The mere recitation of a 
Rule . . . adds an air of legitimacy to decisions concerning procedure.”); Schauer, supra note 123, at 637 
(“Trial judges sometimes employ [a non-reason-giving] approach, coupling a narrative of their 
conclusions of fact with a quite uninformative list of their conclusions of law.”). 
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particularity defeat the project of giving reasons because “if a reason were 
no more general than the outcome it purports to justify, it would scarcely 
count as a reason.”161 This sort of extreme particularity and factual 
specificity dots the landscape of allegedly disparate joinder decisions. 
Although the opinions may look as if the judges are giving reasons, the 
nature of the writing and conclusions makes the decisions difficult to 
amalgamate into a set of coherent principles. Thus, a reason-giving system 
would be one that “promotes accountability by limiting the scope of 
available discretion.”162 These are rules that would move toward a 
seemingly paradoxical world in which judges’ decisionmaking discretion is 
constrained while their managerial discretion remains intact. 
Although the situation of a judge managing litigation is analogous to 
that of a regulator in the administrative state, they belong to fundamentally 
different institutions of government. The fact that judges are hardly ever 
mandated to give any explanation or particular reasons for their decisions is 
often cited as a feature of the judiciary that distinguishes it from 
agencies.163 Thus, there are serious reasons to consider crafting these rules 
as simply “reason promoting” rather than as full-fledged reason-giving 
requirements in the style of Chenery or the APA. 
As a technical matter, the reason-giving rules that I describe would not 
necessarily have to come in the form of a reason-giving requirement. A 
procedural rule could be crafted with an eye toward promoting reason 
giving without mandating it. Take, for example, the mechanism for remand 
of supplemental jurisdiction cases to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 
This Section allows a judge to remand a claim to state court, even if the 
supplemental jurisdiction requirements of § 1367(a) are met. The text of 
§ 1367(c) follows the form that I recommend above. It begins with an 
explicit grant of discretion,164 and then presents a list of four factors that the 
judge should consider when making her decision.165 At no point, however, 
does this statute require that a judge state her reasons for decision. Review 
of decisions under § 1367(c) is made under an “abuse of discretion” 
 
161. Schauer, supra note 123, at 635. For a criticism of the “particularism” argument, see Gerald 
J. Postema, A Similibus ad Similia: Analogical Thinking in Law, in COMMON LAW THEORY 108–110 
(Douglas Edlin ed., 2007). 
162. Staszewski, supra note 155, at 1279. 
163. See Watts, supra note 105, at 25–26. 
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . .”); see also Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 
556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (“A district court’s decision whether to exercise that jurisdiction after 
dismissing every claim over which it had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.”). 
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the 
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original 
jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or 
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”). 
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standard166 which requires the appeals court to reverse only if there has 
been an error in judgment, and not merely an error in reasoning or reason 
giving.167 Despite the apparent lack of a reason-giving requirement, district 
judges remanding (or retaining) supplemental claims under § 1367(c) have 
produced a rich body of justificatory decisions168 with reasons that closely 
align with the factors in the statute and the gloss given by the Supreme 
Court.169 Thus, it is possible for a rule to nudge judges in the direction of 
organized reason giving without imposing a strict reason-giving 
“requirement.” 
A rule that merely promotes reason giving, however, still might not be 
as effective as a reason-giving requirement. Such a rule runs the risk of 
simply encouraging a judge to list factors and state conclusions without 
really stating reasons that identify relevant facts and articulate their 
relevance to a discretionary decision.170 Moreover, a reason-giving 
requirement furthers the goal of regulating the process by which judges 
handle managerial problems, solicit information from litigants, and assess 
possible solutions.171 A Chenery-style rule would require the judge to 
disclose more than a mere statement of conclusory reasons,172 thus 
affecting the process of decisionmaking itself.173 
One of the benefits of this process is that information disclosure is a 
byproduct of reason giving. Information-disclosure theory can itself be a 
powerful regulatory tool and has been cited as a basis for some models of 
 
166. See, e.g., Henderson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 412 F. App’x 74, 79 (10th Cir. 2011); 
Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010). 
167. Although the Supreme Court at one point suggested that “a district court may not remand a 
case to a state court on a ground not specified in the removal statute,” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 
484 U.S. 343, 355 (1988) (citing Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 339 (1976), 
overruled on other grounds by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996)), it has expressly 
disclaimed this language. Id. at 356 (limiting Thermtron to cases of “clearly impermissible remand” 
rather than cases of discretionary remand under § 1367(c)). 
168. See Westlaw Notes of Decisions for § 1367(c) for a sampling and summary of such 
decisions. 
169. See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 (“[A] federal court should consider and weigh in each case, at 
every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in order 
to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court involving pendent state-law 
claims.”). 
170. See Macey & Miller, supra note 142, at 61–62 (describing problems with Rule 23). 
171. See Shapiro, supra note 122, at 182 (noting how reason-giving requirements are tied to the 
growth of developing a record). 
172. Id. at 183 (“[A] giving reasons requirement inevitably imposes some pressure on the 
administrator to offer at least summary findings of fact.”); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Some 
Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1435–45 (1992). 
173. See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal 
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 821–23 (stating 
that reason-giving requirements, as implemented through judicial hard look review, force agencies to 
deliberate in a democratically accountable way). 
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reason giving in administrative law.174 This Article does not advocate a 
formal information disclosure regime, insofar as it does not target judges as 
regulatory subjects who are “withholding” important information, the 
disclosure of which would promote a regulatory end in and of itself.175 
Moreover, mandated information disclosure and sharing have been 
criticized as a stand-alone regulatory technique.176 However, the idea of 
information disclosure shares with reason giving the idea of “[using] 
communication as a regulatory mechanism.”177 It bolsters reason giving 
because it helps build the body of information that judges can use, and thus 
heightens the expertise upon which the delegation of discretion is based.178 
Reason giving and information disclosure go hand-in-hand because  “when 
an official’s explanation for her decision is based on empirical claims, they 
should be based upon reliable methods of inquiry and consistent with 
available information.”179 It is the absence of this particularized 
information that renders ineffective a multi-factored or balancing test rule 
that does not carry with it a reason-giving requirement. 
2. Stopping Short of a Writing Requirement 
Although I have argued here for a reason-giving requirement in certain 
procedural rules, I have couched this as a “preliminary” suggestion because 
significant changes or increases to judges’ procedural and substantive 
workload must be carefully evaluated. Moreover, it is unusual to disturb the 
basic assumption that judges need not state particular reasons for their 
 
174. See Short, supra note 8, at 1844 (attributing information-disclosure theories to scholars 
promoting political reason giving). 
175. Id. at 1846 (summarizing the five characteristics of an information disclosure regime). 
176. See Ryan W. Scott, The Skeptic’s Guide to Information Sharing at Sentencing, 2013 UTAH 
L. REV. (forthcoming); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 681 (2011). 
177. ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 47 
(2008). Some scholars have investigated whether procedural rules can serve an information-forcing 
function for the parties about the values of their claims and the costs of litigating. See Nagareda, supra 
note 95, at 653 (“A world of vanishing trials invites exploration of whether procedural doctrine might 
benefit from the development of additional pretrial motions that are not dispositive but, rather, 
informative—motions that do not speak to whether trial may occur but seek instead to inform directly 
the pricing of claims via settlement.”); Alex Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2012, at 1 (arguing that the Twombly/Iqbal interpretation has turned Rule 8(a) 
into an information-forcing rule for parties). 
178. The choice between rules and standards, for example, is often couched as one involving the 
government’s acquisition and dissemination of information about the appropriate content of the law. 
Whether a law should be given content ex ante or ex post involves determining whether information 
should be gathered and processed before or after individuals act. See Kaplow, supra note 3, at 585. 
179. Staszewski, supra note 155, at 1282. 
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decisions.180  For this reason, I resist concluding that a reason-giving 
requirement should always take the form of a written opinion. 
Judges’ decisions can take the form of oral rulings from the bench, 
short memoranda and orders or minute entries memorializing a ruling in a 
docket, or longer written opinions. Written opinions are a natural fit for 
reason-giving rules insofar as the process of writing may enhance and 
refine judicial reasoning181 and the existence of written opinions serve a 
valuable publicity function.182  This Article stops short, however, of 
recommending that rulemakers codify a writing obligation as part of a 
reason-giving directive. 
There are good reasons to view a writing requirement with a healthy 
degree of skepticism. First, writing opinions is a time-consuming process. 
Any procedural rule that places additional burdens on an already resource-
strained judiciary is unlikely to be met with great enthusiasm. This, in and 
of itself, is not a reason to jettison a pursuit of written opinions. If the 
project of giving reasons can substantially improve outcomes in a particular 
area of law, then it is worth imposing on the judiciary to garner those 
benefits. The concern about limited judicial resources, however, should be 
taken seriously. The procedural devices that this Article considers are, 
almost by definition, those that rarely involve direct engagement with the 
merits of a lawsuit. A reason-giving rule that required a judge to provide a 
written statement of reasons for every single joinder or discovery decision 
would likely prove too onerous a burden, especially if a judge’s managerial 
tasks should play a secondary role in a system that should be advancing the 
cause of dispute resolution.183 
Second, while the idea that the process of writing augments reasoning 
abilities has intuitive appeal, that claim has not been empirically verified. 
In his careful survey of psychological research on this subject, Professor 
Oldfather has concluded that “the common understanding concerning the 
 
180. Although this is the default position, there are a few instances where federal judges are or 
have been subject to a reason-giving requirement. See AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3) (2006); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 59 (when granting an order for a new trial on its own initiative, “the court must specify the 
reasons in its order”); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL; see also Ryan W. Scott, The Skeptic’s 
Guide to Information Sharing at Sentencing, 2013 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming) (summarizing 
information disclosure and reason-giving requirements in state and federal sentencing schemes). 
181. See Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L REV. 
1421, 1447 (1995) (“In thinking about a case, a judge might come to a definite conclusion yet find the 
conclusion indefensible when he tries to write an opinion explaining and justifying it.”); Schauer, supra 
note 123, at 652 (suggesting and questioning whether “the very fact of writing . . . serves as a 
constraint”). 
182. Schwartzman, supra note 151, at 1008–12 (explaining the value of publicity of judges’ 
reasons). 
183. See J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012) 
(criticizing pretrial rules of procedure that fail to advance dispute resolution in the modern reality of 
vanishing trials and frequent settlement). 
EFFRON 683-733 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/2014  1:32 PM 
2014] Reason Giving and Rule Making 729 
utility of [written] judicial opinions usually holds true,”184 but that there are 
certain situations in which verbalizing or writing opinions would not 
improve—or could even worsen—reasoning.185 The situations that 
Oldfather identifies are those in which “judges must make decisions based 
on complex, multifaceted inputs, subject to a host of competing 
considerations.”186 Oldfather’s summary of the psychological research is 
that these types of decisions depend on both articulable and inarticulable 
reasons, and that a writing (or verbalization) requirement will lead a judge 
“to overweigh the articulable components of his analysis relative to other 
factors.”187 
Many of the procedural devices described in Part I of this Article fit 
Oldfather’s description of situations where one should be wary of 
privileging written opinions—they are “complex, fact-intensive situations” 
that require “context-based judgments.”188 One of Oldfather’s important 
insights, however, is that it is difficult to discern the boundaries between 
cases where opinion writing improves, worsens, or has no effect on 
reasons, and that “there may be no reliable way to make an ex ante 
determination of which category a particular case falls into.”189 It is the 
judge herself who is in the best, albeit imperfect, position to gauge whether 
a written opinion would worsen reasoning through a fact-specific situation, 
or whether a written opinion would in fact force a more careful 
consideration of the complex facts that contribute to the difficulty of the 
decision. 
The concerns I have outlined regarding a mandate to write opinions 
should not distract from the overall utility of the project of reason giving. 
The reason-giving rules that I have described would not necessarily be 
aimed at changing the number or even the length of written decisions, but 
in changing the quality of the opinions that trial judges are already writing 
on these subjects, and perhaps by encouraging judges at the margins to 
choose a written opinion or verbalized statement over a summary order. As 
detailed earlier, a well-crafted reason-giving rule would improve the 
overall quality and usefulness of judicial opinions in these areas by 
encouraging greater transparency in reasoning, as well as greater 
comparability by unifying and aligning the factors and policies that a judge 
should consider. 
Finally, as documents such as transcripts of oral arguments and rulings 
from the bench become increasingly available to parties and easily 
 
184. Oldfather, supra note 121, at 1286. 
185. See id. at 1303–17. 
186. Id. at 1321. 
187. Id. at 1322. 
188. Id. at 1286–87. 
189. Id. at 1324. 
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searchable, the reason-giving exercise remains valuable even when it is not 
a written opinion. Although the advent of costless and hassle-free access to 
court documents has not fully arrived,190 it is only a matter of time before 
verbal rulings can contribute to the information base of judicial decisions. 
Whether or not these rulings would have the same precedential value as 
written opinions, the transparency of readily available and well-reasoned 
orders might change the lawyering landscape in the way that “unpublished” 
but easily accessible written opinions once did. 
3.  Appellate Review 
Enforcement of the Chenery principle depends heavily on the judicial 
review policing the reasoning given in agency decisions.191 Because the 
reason-giving principles and judicial review of agency action have 
developed in tandem,192 it is difficult to disentangle the project of reason 
giving from the role of the federal courts in supervising agency action. This 
raises two issues for my proposal. First, it suggests that any reason-giving 
requirement must also incorporate an ideal standard of review. Second, it 
means that the success of this project must account for the fact that many of 
these decisions are insulated from appellate review—a fact that causes 
some of these problems in the first place.193 
The current standard of review for most procedural decisions is de 
novo review—the standard of review for most questions of law. That being 
said, appellate courts often defer to trial court decisions about matters such 
as joinder when they are heavily fact-contingent and implicate managerial 
concerns. One positive consequence of making an explicit grant of 
discretion in a reason-giving rule is that it could clarify the standard of 
review by making it into an abuse of discretion standard. 
There are many procedural rules for which direct enforcement via de 
novo review is desirable. These are the rules that fit comfortably within 
categories described in Part I, rules where regulation and uniformity trump 
a desire for discretion and where the opportunities for appellate review are 
not muffled through the structural features of the final judgment rule. These 
 
190. See John Schwartz, An Effort to Upgrade a Court Archive System to Free and Easy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/us/13records. 
html?r=0. 
191. Enforcement of the Chenery I doctrine is achieved through “hard look” review, which has 
been a major tool in policing the processes of agency decisionmaking. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, 
Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 529–31 (1985) (describing the hard look 
doctrine and its uses); see also Stack, supra note 110, at 973 (“[I]nadequate explanation [by agencies] is 
still among the most common grounds for judicial reversal and remand.”). 
192. Shapiro, supra note 122, at 184–89. 
193. See id. at 182–84. 
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are rules where rulemakers have not (or should not have)194 delegated the 
development and interpretation of the rules to trial judges. In other words, 
delegation, reason giving, and deference go together. Although the lack of 
appellate review might seem to lessen the incentives for judges to adhere to 
the letter and spirit of reason-giving rules,195 this type of rule design is, in 
part, a response to the absence of appellate review for some devices in the 
first place. 
If reason-giving rules are designed to accommodate rather than resist a 
lack of appellate review, then their success does not depend on heavy 
appellate supervision.196 Such a system relies on the process of reason 
giving rather than on outside enforcement. Thus, reason giving is a second-
best solution—a recognition of the real-world constraints of the futility of 
dictating meaningful standards, as well as the institutional difficulties of 
policing the reasoning of judges as if they were administrators. 
Recognizing the limitations of a judicial reason-giving project does not 
detract from its appeal as a practical solution where other approaches have 
come up short. After all, “deliberative accountability is self-consciously 
aspirational in nature.”197 
Moreover, promoting reason giving without strict enforcement via 
appellate review might help ward off some of the problems that scholars 
have identified with the hard look doctrine in the administrative state, 
namely that constant scrutiny and remands of agency decisions have led to 
“ossification” of the administrative process.198 The analogous concern here 
is that an overly burdensome reason-giving structure would slow litigation 
and make judges overly cautious and unwilling to pursue procedural 
innovations in difficult cases. The absence of appellate review might 
promote the right amount of reason giving without chilling the willingness 
of judges to make a few bold policy decisions in the managerial arena. The 
success of any reason-giving rules will depend on a delicate balance 
 
194. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 99, at 1192 (arguing that rules such as those 
governing pleading standards should be amended by a formal rulemaking process and not subject to 
development through Supreme Court or lower court adjudication). 
195. Commentators are skeptical that avoiding reversal is a large factor in how judges make 
decisions. See Kim, supra note 37, at 398 (noting the difficulties in determining how district judges 
would act in order to avoid reversal); Posner, supra note 155, at 14–15 (arguing that avoiding reversal 
plays a small role in the utility function representing what judges maximize); Short, supra note 8, at 
1854 (“[D]isclosers often simply resist or ignore mandates, especially when enforcement mechanisms 
are weak or uneven.”). 
196. See Watts, supra note 105, at 38–39 (noting the lack of judicial review as a constraint on 
Supreme Court certiorari decisions). 
197. Staszewski, supra note 155, at 1297. 
198. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor 
Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 271–74 (1987) (arguing that intrusive judicial review leads to 
reduced rule making and increased vehicle recalls at the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration); McGarity, supra note 172, at 1400–03 (arguing that agencies will avoid new 
rulemaking if hard look review makes the process too burdensome). 
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between burdening judges with onerous writing requirements and 
encouraging better and more useful opinions concerning the use of certain 
procedural devices. Avoiding stringent standards of appellate review would 
lessen these burdens and avoid a trend toward ossification in procedural 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of using a reason-giving approach in designing certain 
procedural rules is to regulate some procedural devices through the process 
of organized reasoning by judges rather than through the direct use of 
global but vague standards governing a device’s application. This type of 
procedural rule calls for rethinking the role that common law reasoning 
plays in the development of such procedural rules. 
Traditionally, the holdings and reasoning of judicial opinions play a 
front-and-center role in the development of the law in a common law 
system. In a common law system, judicial opinions exist not only to set 
forth a systematic and transparent account of how and why a judge has 
reached a particular conclusion, but also to create, elucidate, and solidify 
legal principles. Although courts of appeals are a cornerstone of the law-
giving function of courts, trial court judges also participate in the 
development of legal principles. 
Because developing the law is such a central function of judges in a 
common law system, it is natural to assume that “something” should 
happen with all of the reasoning processes and accretions of information 
that judges will be producing in opinions. 
I believe that we should resist the urge to think of a body of judicial 
opinions as automatic fodder for common-law rule making. Just as 
unpublished appellate court opinions can furnish information about how 
judges understand and process particular factual and legal scenarios, 
procedural decisions based on reason giving and process can provide 
meaningful data to future judges and litigants. In other words, the purpose 
of reason-giving rules has been fulfilled once the judge has taken the 
appropriate steps in transparent reasoning, and once information about the 
costs, burdens, and benefits of the use of a particular procedural device in a 
given case has been revealed. Where commentators and rulemakers have 
gone wrong is by trying to shoehorn a potential wealth of judicial 
knowledge and experience concerning procedural devices into a common 
law mold of precedential and binding authority. A more realistic picture of 
the corpus of these written decisions is that they would constitute a 
“dialogue [that] would engage and draw upon a set of fact patterns” to 
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“facilitate the development of the law.”199  These rules—rich in information 
but freed from the constraints of strict precedent—are the beginning of that 
conversation. 
 
 
199. Douglas A. Berman & Jeffrey O. Cooper, In Defense of Less Precedential Opinions: A 
Reply to Chief Judge Martin, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 2025, 2040 (1999) (emphasis added) (discussing the 
value of citable unpublished opinions for the development of law in appellate courts). 
